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Abstract 
 
School Choice, Segregation, and Academic Outcomes: 
Educational Trajectories under a Controlled Choice Student Assignment Policy 
(Under the direction of Dennis K. Orthner) 
 
During the past twenty years there has been an increase in the number and variety of 
school choice policy options in education.  Influential articles and reports such as A Nation at 
Risk document the failures of our public education system with tales of gaps in achievement 
by race, gender, social class, and country.  School choice is widely discussed as a solution to 
these, and other, issues.  Administered appropriately, proponents argue, school choice could 
liberate low-income and minority students from their underperforming schools and give them 
access to the higher performing schools of the upper and middle class.  Yet, there is also 
evidence of unintended consequences resulting from school choice such as increased racial 
and socioeconomic segregation. 
The three papers included in this dissertation discuss and evaluate different aspects of 
school choice.  The first paper, “Evaluating School Choice: Considerations for Research and 
Policy,” discusses the varieties and extent of school choice currently available in the United 
States, summarizes the multidisciplinary theory that frames school choice research, and 
develops a conceptual framework based on theory and educational purpose as a guide to 
future evaluations. 
The second paper, “Racial and Socioeconomic Segregation in a District with Controlled 
School Choice,” uses a multilevel comparison model to examine the relationship between a 
iv 
controlled choice student assignment plan and racial and socioeconomic segregation over an 
eleven-year period.  Findings indicate an increase in school-level racial and socioeconomic 
segregation within the district during the implementation of the student assignment plan. 
The third paper, “School Choice, Racial Segregation, and Student Academic Outcomes,” 
uses a multilevel growth model to examine the impact of attending racially segregated 
schools on academic test scores.  The results confirm previous research regarding the racial 
achievement gap and indicate no discernable effect on student achievement growth over time 
that can be attributed to the racial makeup of the school. 
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Evaluating School Choice: 
Considerations for Research and Policy 
 
Abstract 
Over the past twenty years, school choice in the United States has become a widely 
supported catch phrase for a growing collection of policies and practices designed to increase 
parental and student involvement in school assignments.  A careful evaluation of the impact 
of school choice on educational practices and outcomes is essential to demonstrate the long-
term value of the trend.  In this paper, I make three contributions to the collective effort to 
evaluate the impact of school choice.   First, I clarify the type and variety of school choice 
programs and provide an estimated current summary of the extent of school choice available 
and used in the United States.  Second, using market and social science theory, I review the 
theoretical and empirical basis both for school choice and for potential unintended 
consequences.  Finally, I develop a conceptual framework to guide future evaluation research 
in light of the seldom-discussed purpose of public education as well as the theory that 
underlies school choice policy.  Considerations such as the type of school choice, the 
theoretical foundations of school choice and its potential consequences, and purpose-driven 
outcome measures are essential in future evaluation of this growing policy trend.  
2Evaluating School Choice: Considerations for Research and Policy 
 
Education policy in the United States today is intense and confusing.  The public 
press and academic journals debate such issues as high-stakes testing, accountability, 
financial equity and adequacy, school assignment policies and administrative bureaucracy.  
Newspaper and magazine articles and reports such as A Nation at Risk (National Commission 
on Excellence in Education 1983) bemoan the failures of our public education system by 
rehearsing tales of gaps in achievement by race, gender, social class, and country.  A recent 
update of the Nation at Risk report finds little improvement in U.S. education since 1970—
some progress in narrowing resource gaps, but a continuing, albeit slightly smaller, 
achievement gap (Peterson 2005).   
School choice is widely discussed, in its many institutional forms, as a potential 
solution to several of the problems mentioned above (e.g., Kahlenberg 2001; Peterson 2005).  
Administered appropriately, proponents argue, parents would choose the school that best 
meets the needs of their student(s), and the result would be several benefits to the current 
system.  First, it would liberate low-income and minority students from their 
underperforming schools and give them access to the higher performing schools of the upper 
and middle class, thus reducing the racial and socioeconomic achievement gaps.  Second, it 
would force administrators to make schools more efficient and improve education.  In our 
consumerist society, choosing between schools seems to be as reasonable as choosing 
between different makes and models of cars.  However, critics of school choice suggest that 
school choice is not the panacea some proponents offer, and that there are unknown and 
unintended consequences of school choice (e.g., Betts and Loveless 2005; Henig 1994). 
3In this paper I make three important contributions to the debate about school choice.  
First, I provide examples of current school choice policies as well as make a rough estimate 
of the number of U.S. students impacted by school choice.  Second, I examine the 
multidisciplinary social science theory that underlies the debates surrounding school choice.  
Finally, I develop a conceptual model of school outcomes, clarified by this multidisciplinary 
theoretical foundation, which is based on a neglected discussion of the purpose of public 
education and its role in the United States.  
Background on School Choice 
While school choice overall is becoming more prevalent in the United States, there 
are widely divergent views about what constitutes “school choice,” and what is generally 
understood by that phrase.  Historically, student assignment has been almost exclusively a 
decision made by school boards; however, over time, student assignment has become 
decentralized due to increasing school choice.  School authorities traditionally assigned most 
children to a “neighborhood school,” thus limiting school choice to neighborhood choice and 
advantaging parents who could afford to live in more exclusive neighborhoods, often with 
small, exclusive school districts.  During the late 1960s, after the Brown v. Board of 
Education decision in 1954, federal courts began to require local school boards to design and 
implement policies to end racial segregation (Green v. New Kent County School Board 
1968).  Schools affected by court-ordered desegregation plans assigned students to schools in 
order to balance the schools’ racial compositions, and school boards had fewer options in 
setting their assignment policies.  Many districts, as an alternative to busing, developed such 
school choice options such as magnet schools—an option that increased choice for parents 
who selected integration.  Because the courts have relaxed requirements to assign students 
4based on race, and in an effort to integrate schools through choice, some additional districts 
have returned to local control and developed school choice options such as magnet schools.  
Districts that were never under a court-ordered desegregation plan now also offer more 
student assignment options because parents request them and because school choice is 
frequently seen as a solution to perceived problems in the U.S. public education system 
(Chubb and Moe 1990; Kahlenberg 2001; Peterson 2005).  Finally, No Child Left Behind 
(2002) includes elements of choice in that it permits students attending failing schools to 
transfer to another public school of their choice, an increase in the trend toward school 
choice.   
Types and Scope of School Choice 
All U.S. school districts offer one or more varieties of school choice, or different 
degrees of parental and student involvement in school assignment. One of the difficulties in 
evaluating school choice is the institutional variety of school choice plans and the constant 
change in these plans and their availability, as well as poor take-up data.  Estimating the 
usage of school choice plans is, at best, based on “back of the envelope” calculations.  
However, the availability of school choice options is more easily estimated. 
School choice options can be classified into three groups: advantaged choice, 
intradistrict choice, and interdistrict choice.  By far the most commonly available and used 
form of school choice is advantaged choice, which an estimated 17.4 million students use—
approximately 28% of total school-age children in the United States.  The other two 
categories, intradistrict and interdistrict choice, are used by an estimated 5 million students—
approximately 8% of total school-age children in the United States, or 11-14% of public 
school students (see Appendix A for details and references). 
5The first school choice category includes residential choice, private schools, and 
home school (Henig and Sugarman 1999).  In residential choice, families purchase homes 
based on their perception of the quality of neighborhood schools.  Students who are home 
schooled may participate in public or private schools for a portion of the school day, yet 
receive a significant portion, if not all, of their instruction from their parent(s) in their home 
environment.  I call this category of traditional forms of school choice advantaged choice,
because it is available primarily to advantaged families—those families with financial 
resources to pay for private schools, homes in exclusive neighborhoods with high-quality 
schools or temporal resources to teach their children at home.  These forms of school choice 
are available everywhere in the United States, although fewer private schools are available in 
rural areas. 
The second school choice category is intradistrict choice, or options within a district, 
including magnet schools, controlled choice, and student transfers.  At least forty states and 
the District of Columbia offer magnet schools, which may provide special classes and often a 
schoolwide focus, and are subject to state-imposed requirements and usually state testing.  
Students who apply to magnet schools are admitted under specific admission policies 
determined by the school board.  Controlled choice is available in districts in Massachusetts, 
North Carolina, and Florida, among others (Fiske 2002; Willie, Edwards, and Alves 2002).  
Controlled choice requires that all parents and students rank their choice of schools, usually 
with a theme or emphasis; then school district officials assign students based on those 
rankings and the district’s school assignment policy.  Student transfers to another school 
within a residential district are available in all but ten states (NCES, 2005, see Appendix A).  
Approximately, two million students use intradistrict school choice. 
6The third school choice category is interdistrict school choice, or options between 
districts within a single state.  This choice includes charter schools, statewide open 
enrollment, urban-suburban programs, and public voucher plans.  Charter schools, while 
often operated within a single district, are licensed by the state and are usually open to any 
student, regardless of district.  As in magnet schools, students apply to charter schools and 
are admitted under specific admission rules outlined in the charter.  Approximately 655,000 
students attended 2,368 charter schools in the 2001-2002 school year, but the number of 
students has increased as 3,623 charter schools were operating in 2005.  Open enrollment 
school choice requires that all students apply to their preferred public schools, and it allows 
them to attend, if accepted, any public school within an area, either within a district or 
between districts.  Currently, while forty-six states allow at least some students to attend 
schools in any district, no state requires that all students apply to their preferred public 
school(s) for admission (NCES table, see Appendix A).  Urban-suburban programs are 
located in specific metropolitan areas with separate urban and suburban school districts (e.g., 
Ryan and Heise 2002).  These programs, developed with the purpose of integrating schools, 
primarily bus urban students to suburban schools.  Finally, school vouchers allow parents and 
students to choose a school, often public or private; and all or a portion of the tuition is paid 
by the sponsoring institution—a state or local school district, wealthy individuals, or 
nonprofit foundations—to the school the parents have chosen.  Voucher programs are 
available for low-income or disabled students in many states (Florida, Utah) and cities 
(Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Washington, DC, New York City, New York, Cleveland, Ohio) 
(Henig and Sugarman 1999; Howell, Wolf, Campbell, and Peterson 2002).  Over 40,000 
7students use these publicly funded vouchers.  Overall, an estimated 720,000 public school 
students participate in interdistrict school choice programs (see Appendix A for references). 
All of these institutionally unique programs increase the ability of parents and 
students to choose the school the student attends, yet relatively few U.S. students take 
advantage of these options.  Given the poor quality of the data available on school choice 
usage—many of the numbers in Appendix A are from the 2001-2002 school year; and other 
numbers such as transfers within and between districts, are unavailable—a rough estimate 
based on the most current available data indicates that approximately 11% of U.S. students 
take advantage of intra- and interdistrict public school choice programs (see Appendix A).  
This number is close to the estimated 14% made by other researchers (Bielick and Chapman 
2003).  As the availability of school choice increases, the number of students exercising 
school choice will continue to grow.  Evaluating current school choice policies and their 
impact on educational outcomes is essential to guide future policy decisions with respect to 
school choice.  
As illustrated above, the institutional variety of school choice policies and practices 
inherently creates difficulties for researchers analyzing the impact of school choice on public 
education.  This is due largely to the individual characteristics of unique district-specific 
assignment policies and practices that make the results of these studies difficult to generalize 
among the growing varieties of institutional designs (Witte 2000).  In addition to the 
difficulties from institutional variety, school choice evaluations draw from a variety of 
theoretical areas. 
School Choice Theoretical Models 
8The theoretical basis for most school choice evaluation is implied, rather than 
explicit.  One of the contributions of this paper is to use market and stratification theory to 
clarify that theoretical foundation.  Research that evaluates school choice examines primarily 
two issues: school productivity, typically measured by student test scores; and the unintended 
consequences of school choice, such as racial and socioeconomic segregation.  Although not 
cleanly divided between the two, research in these areas emphasizes two different theoretical 
models.   
Market Model 
The theoretical perspective that motivates school productivity models is based on 
market theory, with individual consumer decisions at the core.  School choosers, parents 
and/or students, are the “stakeholders and consumers”; and education providers, school 
administrators and teachers, are the “suppliers.”  In a perfect market, schools would operate 
in an optimal situation where parents’ and students’ preferences would be met, the result 
being improved efficiencies and academic outcomes.1 Despite the potential advantages from 
competition, there are concerns that an unrestrained market is not an appropriate model for 
public education.  Betts (2005), after carefully reviewing the assumptions needed for perfect 
competition, concluded that the education market violates those assumptions.  He concluded 
that rather than reducing bureaucracy, differentiating products, and liberating low-income 
students, school choice will require additional regulations and policies in order to mitigate 
the potential negative consequences of school choice and improve overall educational 
outcomes. 
Proponents of increasing school choice suggest several paths through which 
competition may improve educational outcomes.  The basic argument, as expressed by Paul 
9Peterson (1990), is that increasing the options for individual choice and possible differential 
school funding through consumer involvement will encourage schools to maximize consumer 
services or lose students to other schools.  This is the model that underlies Public Law 107-
110, known as “No Child Left Behind,” whereby students who attend “failing” schools—as 
indicated by test scores overall and by racial subgroup—have an option to choose a different, 
non-failing, school to attend.   The schools losing students thus have an incentive to either 
improve their product or differentiate it from the competition, or eventually face the 
consequences of being shut down.  This incentive to differentiate, Goldring and Shapira 
(1993) argue, may encourage the suppliers to specialize in distinct curricula and pedagogical 
philosophies, and thus allow parents and students to match style and interest from a wider 
variety of schools.  Greater compatibility among student learning styles, interests, teaching 
styles and curriculum may then improve the students’ academic outcomes.  Similarly, Chubb 
and Moe (1988) suggest that increased choice will decrease bureaucracy, which will in turn 
make schools more efficient and improve educational outcomes.  In response to this 
argument, Lubienski (2006), reviewing research on school choice programs in Chile, New 
Zealand, and Great Britain, found that instead of diversifying teaching practices, schools 
were embracing more traditional curriculum and choosing to innovate through marketing and 
image management.   
Another path by which competition may improve education outcomes is to eliminate 
the connection between housing prices and neighborhood school quality.  Traditionally, 
when students attended neighborhood schools, because of the close correlation between 
school quality and the price of homes, parents purchased education along with their housing 
costs (Tiebout 1956).  Hoxby (2003) argues that school choice has the potential to relax 
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housing budget constraints, allowing consumers to choose a school regardless of 
neighborhood housing costs and thus liberate low-income students from poor quality schools.  
A national study comparing areas with magnet school to areas without found no difference in 
socioeconomic distribution, evidence that magnet schools, one variety of school choice, are 
not liberating low-income students (Archbald 2004).  While there are several potential paths 
by which school choice may improve educational outcomes, significant unintended 
consequences may also require additional, not less, regulation to facilitate competition in the 
public education market.  
Stratification Model 
The theoretical perspective that motivates evaluation models by examining the 
unintended consequences of school choice is based on social science theory and research on 
community interactions and networks.  Research in this area focuses on the impact of school 
choice on peer groups and segregation, and their impact on individual educational outcomes.  
The researchers’ primary concern is that school choice will result in schools stratified by 
race, socioeconomic status, or even parental involvement.  Such stratification may have 
detrimental effects not only on individual students, but on society as a whole. 
Peer effects—the impact of an individual’s social environment—observed in 
education may operate either directly through students or indirectly through resource 
allocation.  Sociologists like Blau (1964) and Homans (1974) suggest that direct peer 
influences occur when group definitions of appropriate behavior are adopted, as if those 
definitions unconsciously create a personal matrix that includes the costs and benefits of 
social choices which either conform or fail to conform to peer group norms.  Peer effects also 
measure an indirect peer effect, a correlation with available school resources and 
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organizations that indirectly influences student academic outcomes.  For example, in general, 
middle-class schools have better trained teachers, more challenging curriculum, and more 
involved parents; thus stratification by class would result in a decrease in quality of low-
income, minority schools (Cook and Evans 2000; Kahlenberg 2001).  These peer effects have 
the potential to operate on multiple, overlapping levels—e.g., race, gender, socioeconomic 
status, parental involvement. 
In general, researchers find some evidence of general peer effects at the family and 
neighborhood (Case and Katz 1991), high school (Zimmer and Toma 2000),  and college 
levels (Sacerdote 2000).  It is less clear that school peer composition affects academic 
outcomes.  While one study using the natural variation in gender and race between grades to 
identify peers  found that classroom composition affected academic outcomes (Hoxby 2000), 
another study using stable cohorts and a value-added model found that the racial composition 
of schools did not significantly influence student academic outcomes (Jones-Sanpei 2006).  
The impact of peer effects may also vary by race; one study found that a higher percentage of 
Black schoolmates had an adverse effect on the achievement of Blacks (Hanushek, Kain, and 
Rivkin 2002). 
Stratification by socioeconomic status also affects educational outcomes, either 
through direct or indirect peer effects.  For example, Rumberger and Palardy’s (2005) study 
of over 14,000 students in 913 U.S. high schools used resources available at the school level 
to find that the average socioeconomic level of students’ schools had as much impact on their 
achievement growth as their own socioeconomic status, net of other background factors.  
A third possible stratification category is parental involvement which indirectly 
influences student achievement through expectations and school resources.  This is reflected 
12 
in Rumberger and Palardy’s (2005) study of the differential school resource allocations or 
indirect peer effects.  For example, parents involved in their children’s education voice 
concerns and participate in the school community; the potential result is school policies that 
would be good for all the students, not just their own (Brandl 1998).  The loss of these 
parents and the potential for them to congregate in choice schools could be an overall loss for 
the schools and students left behind.  A key factor in school choice policies is access to 
information.  However, even with school choice information available to all consumers, 
differences in parental access and abilities suggest different opportunities to use the 
information (Bourdieu 1970).  For example, parents with greater time constraints, such as 
multiple jobs or health problems, may not be able to use the information as effectively as 
others, the potent result being student sorting by parental involvement.  One example is that 
parent volunteer hours are required at many charter schools, which effectively excludes 
students whose parents have greater time constraints, thus potentially sorting by parental 
involvement.   
 The two theoretical approaches discussed above, the market model and stratification 
model, emphasize different aspects of school choice.  School choice has the potential to 
improve educational outcomes.  Yet it also has the potential to further divide society.  The 
following section incorporates both perspectives into a third approach by developing a goal-
driven evaluation model. 
Evaluating School Choice in Public Education 
Purpose of Public Education 
The first step in evaluating any public policy is to consider the policy’s mission, goals 
and objectives.  Education policy often skips this step, either assuming agreement or 
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avoiding the discussion due to space or time constraints, with some noted exceptions 
(Gutmann 2000; Wolf 2005).  There is diversity of opinions among educators, parents, and 
other interested parties regarding the purpose of education, yet two statements of public 
education goals suggest the potential for broad categories that could be incorporated into a 
conceptual model. 
First, the Goals 2000: Educate America Act (1994) included, among goals on school 
readiness, school completion, teacher readiness, and parental participation, a goal for student 
achievement and citizenship: “By the year 2000, all students will leave grades 4, 8, and 12 
having demonstrated competency over challenging subject matter including English, 
mathematics, science, foreign languages, civics and government, economics, arts, history, 
and geography, and every school in America will ensure that all students learn to use their 
minds well, so they may be prepared for responsible citizenship, further learning, and 
productive employment in our Nation’s modern economy.”  In addition to the commonly 
accepted goal of academic competency, this goal statement includes civics education, 
preparation for responsible citizenship, and preparation for productive employment. 
This relatively recent list of public education goals concurs with a historical list given 
by Thomas Jefferson to the commissioners of the University of Virginia in 1818.  Jefferson’s 
goals for public education were 
• To give to every citizen the information he needs for the 
transaction of his own business; 
• To enable him to calculate for himself, and to express and 
preserve his ideas, his contracts and accounts, in writing; 
• To improve, by reading, his morals and faculties; 
• To understand his duties to his neighbors and his country, and 
to discharge with competence the functions confided to him by 
either; 
• To know his rights; to exercise with order and justice those he 
retains, to choose with discretion the fiduciary of those he 
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delegates; and to notice their conduct with diligence, with 
candor, and judgment; 
• And in general, to observe with intelligence and faithfulness all 
the social relations under which he shall be placed. (Jefferson 
1944: 400-401)  
 
These statements suggest that public education goals include both private 
goods—those that benefit a single individual; and public goods—those that provide 
benefits to a number of individuals simultaneously without diminishing returns to 
individuals.  Private goods include personal income, professional success, personal well-
being, and the ability to interact with a diverse group of individuals.  Public goods 
include civic engagement, political activity, tax revenue, qualified worker pools, 
increased numbers of volunteers, and equality of opportunity.  There is some overlap 
between public and private goods produced by education, such as increased tax revenue 
from high-wage earners.  However, as one researcher suggests, public education is an 
investment in the individual by society, benefiting both the individual and society (Levin 
1987).  Because education provides both public and private goods, education policy and 
research should use models that include both private and public goods as desired 
outcomes.   
The two lists of goals, both modern and historical, can be loosely grouped into 
three categories: first, the widely accepted individual outcomes of academic 
achievement and job readiness; second, community outcomes such as parental 
empowerment and social capital networks; and third, individual social outcomes, such as 
future political engagement, social skills, and civic skills.   
Community Outcomes 
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The first goal category of public education emphasizes such community outcomes as 
parental empowerment and community social capital.  Previously, the involvement of parents 
in their children’s education has been treated as a means to higher academic outcomes; 
however, parental empowerment, in addition to increasing parental involvement, is a means 
in itself in that it contributes to community social capital.  By bringing parents together to 
improve their children’s education, an optimal public education system fosters civic skills, 
such as deliberation and community decision-making, thus increasing the involvement of 
parents in their children’s education, and empowering them by increasing social capital at the 
community level.  On a community level, social capital refers to the relationships and 
networks existing among individuals and groups that can be called upon for support or 
reciprocity in times of need (Putnam 2000).  Like human and economic capital, social capital 
facilitates productive activity, increasing production through networks and relationships.  
Specific forms of social capital include obligations and expectations, information channels, 
and social norms (Coleman 1988).  Social capital enables members of communities to trust 
one another and establish business and political organizations. 
A democratic society requires an educated populace (Pangle and Pangle 2000)—
citizens with “the capacity to cope with political disagreements among citizens in a more 
mutually justifiable way than its alternatives” (Gutmann 2000).  A functioning democracy 
relies on the ability of its members to show mutual respect, tolerance, and deliberation—
skills that promote social capital.  These civic skills, taught in homes and in schools, have 
traditionally been practiced by students in schools, and by adults in school board meetings 
and community groups.  As part of the political system, schools provide opportunities for 
citizens to be involved in the democratic process through school board elections and 
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parent/teacher associations, thus encouraging parental empowerment, as well as 
demonstrating to succeeding generations the civic virtues that may allow them to build 
individual social capital and participate in the political society. 
Individual Outcomes 
The second goal category of public education emphasizes individual outcomes used 
to evaluate school effectiveness, such as academic achievement and job readiness, as shown 
in the center path in Figure 1.  It is closely aligned with the mission of the U.S. Department 
of Education in preparing students to be competitive in future job markets, and it is 
commonly used in education evaluation models (Orthner 2007).  These skills are usually 
measured by changes in standardized exam scores as a result of factors within school control, 
such as, but not limited to, teacher attributes, pedagogical philosophy (learning styles) and 
school structure (classroom reforms) (e.g., Coleman, Campbell, Hobson, McPartland, Mood, 
Weinfeld, and York 1966).  Other factors that affect educational outcomes, as shown by the 
vertical dotted line in Figure 1, include factors outside individual school control—school-
external factors; and factors over which schools have limited control—school-mixed factors.  
Examples of school-external factors include student attributes, student composition, peer 
effects, and future labor markets.  Some school-mixed factors include parental involvement, 
curriculum, funding, equity issues, and community involvement.  The strengths of the 
individual model outcomes are found in simplicity and familiarity, not to mention readily 
accessible data in the form of test scores and multilevel administrative data.  The weaknesses 
of the individual model are that it deemphasizes potentially vital community and individual 
social outcomes. 
Individual Social Outcomes 
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The third goal category of public education emphasizes individual social outcomes, 
such as future political engagement, and individual civic and social skills.  In addition to 
civics education, these goals are realized and practiced through social interactions among 
peer groups.  At the individual level, as discussed above, research on peer effects shows that 
group membership influences individuals who belong to that peer group (Merton 1968).   
Social interactions can also be understood in terms of social capital.  Social capital 
theory introduces a vital distinction between bridging (or inclusive) and bonding (or 
exclusive) social capital (Putnam 2000).  Public schools foster both of these dimensions of 
social capital.  Bonding social capital looks inward, reinforcing exclusive identities and 
homogeneous groups, such as ethnic fraternal organizations, fashionable country clubs, 
church-based book clubs, school clubs and cliques; these lead to advantages such as specific 
reciprocity and solidarity.  On the other hand, bridging social capital looks outward, 
encompassing people across diverse social divides, such as service groups, environmental 
groups, and civil rights movements (Putnam 2000).  Bridging also includes exposure to, and 
interaction with, a diverse group of individuals; these lead to advantages such as information 
diffusion and linkages to external assets.  For example, widespread bridging social capital 
facilitates career networking, while a bonding form of social capital provides solidarity in 
times of personal or family need.  In Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam writes that “[b]onding 
social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue, whereas bridging social capital 
provides a sociological WD-40” (2000: 23).  One potential negative externality is that 
bonding social capital, “by creating strong in-group loyalty, may also create strong out-group 
antagonism…and for that reason we might expect negative external effects to be more 
common with this form of social capital” (Putnam 2000: 23).   
18 
Schools can structure institutional arrangements and policies to emphasize either 
bridging capital, bonding capital, or both.  Segregated schools may be more likely to build 
“bonding” social capital, while desegregated schools may be more likely to encourage 
“bridging” social capital by providing opportunities to practice civic skills of toleration, 
mutual respect, and deliberation, as students and parents interact with individuals from 
different races and socioeconomic classes. 
One example of bridging social capital is the social skill of interacting and working 
with interracial groups.  For example, an amicus brief filed in the 2003 Supreme Court case 
of Grutter v. Bollinger recounts that the U.S. military in the 1960s and 1970s was on the 
verge of self-destruction because of “racial polarization, pervasive disciplinary problems, and 
racially motivated incidents” (“Consolidated brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et.al.” 
2003).  Integration increased the percentage of African-Americans in the enlisted ranks, yet 
the percentage of minority officers was extremely low, leading to pervasive perceptions of 
discrimination.  The brief was written to support racially integrated schools and educational 
settings at the university level, arguing that this educational experience “provides [future 
officers] with invaluable experience for their future command of our nation’s highly diverse 
enlisted ranks” (“Consolidated brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et.al.” 2003).  Amicus 
briefs from various Fortune 500 companies concurred with the importance of integrated 
schools as opportunities to practice working with diverse groups of individuals in preparation 
for working within the increasingly diverse U.S. population (“Brief for Amici Curiae 65 
Leading American Businesses” 2003; “Brief of General Motors Corporation” 2004).  While 
both bridging and bonding capital are important, these military and business leaders, 
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concerned about the lack of bridging capital in the current school system, believe that 
integrated schools will foster bridging social capital. 
 The dashed lines connecting school inputs to community outcomes and 
individual social outcomes in Figure 1 indicate that these potential outcomes are seldom 
included in school choice evaluations.  The private choices made by parents under 
school choice policies have the potential to lead to wide-ranging consequences for 
students and communities, not just impacts on student academic performance. 
Measurement 
In order to include community and individual social outcomes, additional measures 
will be necessary.  Researchers are developing measures of social capital and trust and 
evaluating their school effects.  For example, Bryk and Schneider (2002) found that trust 
among the people within public schools, such as teachers, administrators, and parents, 
affected student academic outcomes.  Other researchers use membership data to measure 
community social capital (Putnam 2000) and ethnic homogeneity, income inequality, 
attachment to place, education, age, and female labor force participation (Rupasingha, Goetz, 
and Freshwater 2005).  Still other researchers are elucidating the relationships between 
political participation and education (Helliwell and Putnam 1999; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-
Barry 1996).   
Use of this broader outcome model will be complicated, given the difficulties of 
education policy research.  For example, empirical models are limited to quantifiable inputs 
and outcomes (Murnane and Nelson 1984) and usually do not include organizational assets 
or non-monetary inputs (Vandenberghe 1999).  Thus the inputs and outcomes of interest are 
often either indicated by poor proxy measures (Koretz 2002) or they are left out of the 
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models.  Ideally, measures of community outcomes and individual social outcomes (Figure 
1) would be included in evaluation models.  Progress is being made in developing relational 
measures such as trust (Bryk and Schneider 2002) and organizational learning (Orthner, 
Cook, Sabah, and Rosenfeld 2006), datasets measuring community social capital (Putnam 
2000; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2005), and elucidating the relationships between 
political participation and education (Helliwell and Putnam 1999; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-
Barry 1996).  The major difficulty is bridging the gap between individual education 
experience and community measures of social capital and political activity. 
Incorporating additional outcomes into these studies will require bridging the gap 
between multiple units of analysis—individual and community—over time.  For example, 
there is a consensus that a relationship between degree attainment and future job preparation 
and earnings exists (Blaug 1991), but a connection between school factors, as in Figure 1, 
and future individual social and community outcomes is only beginning to be explored (e.g., 
Wolf 2005).  Nor has the relationship, if any, between school factors and current community 
outcomes been established.  In addition to the temporal connection, it will be necessary to 
establish a relationship between individual-level preparation for civic and social skills with 
future community outcomes, such as social capital. 
The two primary methods for establishing these relationships are longitudinal studies 
of individuals that incorporate their surrounding environment, both educational and 
community, and using community level outcomes that incorporate measures of community 
migration and individual educational measures.  Longitudinal studies of students beyond 
their primary educational years are expensive and difficult to conduct, and they seldom 
include measures of diversity at the schools students attended.  These in-depth studies that 
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follow individuals over the course of their lives may result in more information regarding 
bridging and bonding social capital in public schools and the impact of student networks and 
social capital on their lives after high school.  For example, while short-term impacts of 
segregation are unclear (Schofield 1995), longitudinal studies show that desegregated 
schooling has a positive long-term effect on the earnings and occupational attainment of 
African American students (Trent 1997), possibly because of the benefits of bridging social 
capital. 
However, if the amount of community migration is known or estimable, it may be 
possible to make assumptions regarding the relationship between a specific community’s 
educational policies and future community measures of social capital.  These data are 
accessible.  Sociologists conduct longitudinal studies of individuals in life-course and aging 
research, demographers measure community migration, and other social scientists measure 
community social capital.  While challenging, incorporating measures of community and 
individual social capital into longitudinal research on students can be accomplished and 
would contribute significantly to a fully informed educational policy. 
School Choice and the School Outcomes Model 
As the discussion of the evaluation models above illustrates, school choice policy and 
research are incomplete without incorporating the multiple inputs and outcomes illustrated in 
Figure 1, based on the multiple purposes of public education discussed above.  The 
advantage of emphasizing the individual outcomes in the center path in Figure 1 is ease in 
measurement and focus.  The primary outcome measured, test scores, reflects private goods 
that accrue principally to the individual student.  The additional outcomes introduce public 
goods through community and individual social capital outcomes, such as parental 
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empowerment, political activity, civic skills, and social skills.  This school-outcomes model 
reinforces the value of social capital, both to communities and to individuals (Putnam 2000).  
For example, bridging social capital, or learning to work with diverse networks, is an 
important goal of public education in a diverse society.  Racially and socially diverse schools 
offer students the opportunity to interact with peers from different social and racial 
backgrounds.  This interaction fosters the social cohesion and civic skills—bridging social 
capital—that are needed in a diverse society. 
Implications and Recommendations for School Choice 
School choice policies, in many different forms, are increasingly being considered by 
local school districts.  The issues discussed in this paper have significant implications for 
evaluating school choice policies.  The variety of institutional programs and the overall low 
student use of school choice programs suggest that rigorous, quantitative case studies may be 
more helpful at this stage than large aggregated evaluations.  These case studies could focus 
on details obscured in aggregated evaluations in order to learn the best practices of the 
different school choice options.  They could also focus on the interest of parents and students 
in school choice programs, to learn whether the low take-up is due to lack of available 
programs, lack of knowledge of available programs, or lack of interest. 
Second, school choice policy, like most public policy research, draws from multiple 
social science disciplines.  While market theory is often used to support school choice, 
theoretical analysis of market competition indicates that public education, like many public 
goods, does not meet the requirements for perfect competition and thus requires more 
regulation, not less (Betts 2005).  Increased community and/or organizational change at the 
school level, such as school specialization and less bureaucracy, may improve academic 
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outcomes.  It may also increase political and community activity among adults as they 
become more involved in their local school communities.  But school choice, through 
incomplete information and unclear or opposing preferences, may also lead to racial and 
economic segregation in public schools, which may then foster conformity and homogeneous 
peer groups.  Peer effects among homogenous peer groups may exacerbate inequalities in 
student achievement, reduce bridging social capital, and fail to provide opportunities to 
practice such civic skills as mutual respect, toleration, and deliberation.  The outcome model 
developed in this paper relies on this multidisciplinary theoretical foundation to illustrate 
how research from sociology, political science, psychology, and economics has a role in 
education policy development and evaluation.   
Finally, a fully informed educational policy can no longer be supported or explained 
solely by test scores and single educational outcomes, such as drop-out rates (Koretz 2002).  
Education is characterized by social interactions, and those interactions must be included in 
the models and research if the goal is to develop a socially optimal system of education that 
serves the broad interests of students and society.  Both positive and negative outcomes may 
be simultaneously possible from school choice.  Smaller class sizes for schools with higher 
percentages of at-risk students and the ability to group students according to ability and 
interest may impact academic achievement positively.  On the other hand, grouping students 
according to ability and interest may result in a decrease in bridging social capital, or less 
toleration and social cohesion, which may or may not impact the preferred academic outcome 
of test scores.  The model of school outcomes proposed in this paper offers a framework for 
education policymakers through which the implications of educational policies such as 
school choice and the unintended consequences of such policies can be considered. 
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As indicated in Figure 1, schools have little or no control over many of the factors 
that contribute to student success.  For example, school administrators can encourage 
parental involvement, but if the parents do not want to be involved, or do not have time to 
participate, there is little they can do about it.  They are also limited with respect to student 
composition, peer effects, and student attributes.  For example, the student composition of a 
school district in the Midwest will look very different from one in the South, Southwest, or 
Northeast.  However, school administrators can do their best to balance schools racially and 
socioeconomically within districts or within reasonable transportation distances, provide 
students additional opportunities for individual social capital development, and provide 
parents opportunities to be involved in the community.  Issues of funding and curriculum are 
often decided at the district, or even state level, although there is a trend to give more 
“management tools” to local school administrators as part of accountability standards.  
However, more important than incorporating any of these inputs into specific policies is for 
school administrators to facilitate and encourage public discourse on the purpose of 
education.  Only when multiple educational outcomes are recognized and debated, if not 
agreed on, will stakeholders recognize the need for policies regarding such inputs as student 
composition and peer effects. 
Given the methodological difficulties of education policy research, incorporating 
additional variables at multiple levels—individual, institutional, and societal—seems 
daunting, but it is necessary to develop socially optimal education policies.  For example, a 
comprehensive evaluation of any education policy will begin with the understanding that 
public education provides both public and private goods, both community and individual 
social capital, and civic and social skills, in addition to primarily private goods, such as 
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academic measures.  Thus, policy evaluation should measure and include multiple outcomes 
in evaluating the policy impact.  In addition to test scores, school choice evaluations should 
include individual measures of political activity, social skills, civic skills, peer interactions, 
and measures of parental empowerment and community networks, as well as institutional and 
classroom level measures.   
 During the past twenty years, school choice has become an increasingly popular 
phrase in education policy.  Future school choice evaluations should consider the type of 
school choice, underlying theories that contribute to school choice, and a goal-driven 
conceptual outcome model.  Only by more carefully evaluating the full complexity of school 
choice programs will we avoid, or limit, the unintended and potentially negative 
consequences of social experiments such as school choice. 
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Endnotes
 
1 In economic terms, the schools would operate along the production possibilities frontier where under the 
circumstances of perfect competition, no one buyer or seller could become better off without making at least 
one other agent worse off—Pareto efficiency.  Under noncompetitive, or monopolistic, conditions, the 
information-gathering costs to operate on the production possibilities frontier would be very high, because 
school administrators would need comprehensive information about consumer preferences and needs (Betts 
2005). 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model of School Outcomes 
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Appendix A: Availability and Estimated Use of School Choice Options 
Students Year Source 
U.S. school-aged children 61.4 million 2001-
2002 
U.S. Census National Population 
Estimates 
U.S. public school children 54.6 million 2001-
2002 
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.as
p?id=65
Availability Estimated students Year Source 
Advantaged Choice  
Residential 
choice 
Everywhere 13.7 million 2001-
2002 
(e.g., Henig and Sugarman 1999, p. 
14-16) 
Private 
schools 
All states, fewer 
in rural areas 
5.3 million 2001-
2002 
(Broughman and Pugh 2005) 
Home 
school 
Everywhere 1.1 million 2002-
2003 
(Princiotta, Bielick, and Chapman 
2004) 
Intradistrict choice 
Magnet 1736 schools 3% (1.6 
million) 
2001-
2002 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/overvie
w03/tables/table_09.asp
Controlled 
choice 
Districts in MA, 
NC, NJ, NY 
~200,000 
students 
2004-
2005 
(Henig 1994: 111); district websites 
(available from author) 
Transfers 30 states unknown 2005 http://nces.ed.gov/programs/staterefor
m/sssco_tab1.asp
Interdistrict choice 
Open-
enrollment  
(Transfers) 
46 states (29 
with multiple 
policies) 
unknown 
 
2005 
 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/staterefor
m/sssco_tab1.asp
Urban-
suburban 
~12 districts/ 
programs 
~25,000 
students 
1995-
2000 
See (Ryan and Heise 2002) for short 
summary of programs. 
Charter 
schools  
2348 schools 
 
3623 schools 
1.2% 
(655,000 
students) 
unknown 
2001-
2002 
 
2005 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/overvie
w03/tables/table_09.asp
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/staterefor
m/sssco_tab2.asp
Public 
voucher 
plans  
DC, WI, FL, 
OH 
~40,000 
students 
2003-
2006 
District websites and public 
announcements (available from 
author). 
Racial and Socioeconomic Segregation in a 
District with Controlled School Choice 
 
Abstract 
 
One of the key policy developments in public education over the past twenty-five 
years has been the increase in school choice.  A major criticism of school choice is the 
potential for racial and economic segregation.  This study uses a two-level hierarchical linear 
model to examine the relationship between a controlled choice plan and racial and 
socioeconomic segregation within a North Carolina school district over an eleven-year 
period.  Findings indicate an increase in school-level racial and socioeconomic segregation 
within the district during the implementation of the controlled choice plan.  While similar 
North Carolina districts, used as comparison groups, also increased in school-level racial and 
socioeconomic segregation, the results of the HLM model comparing policy schools with 
non-policy schools indicate that a controlled choice student assignment plan will increase 
racial and socioeconomic segregation within a district, as measured by deviation from the 
district average. 
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School choice has been a major development in public education for over twenty 
years.  School districts began providing parents and students more choice for a variety of 
reasons, including parental demands, policy shifts to encourage integration through school 
choice, and federal legislation (e.g., No Child Left Behind).  For example, federal “No Child 
Left Behind” legislation requires that students at “failing” schools be allowed to transfer to a 
new school of their choice.  Examples of school choice include assigned schools, 
neighborhood schools, controlled choice, and open enrollment.  Other examples of school 
choice include school vouchers, charter schools, magnet schools, and home school.  Because 
all school districts provide some degree of parental and student involvement in student 
assignment, the policies and processes impacting school choice greatly influence public 
education in the United States. 
Historically, school assignments provided little opportunity for parents to select the 
schools their children attended.  Neighborhood school assignment policies limited school 
choice to residential choice, as students’ residential neighborhoods determined where they 
attended school.  Supreme Court decisions in Brown vs. Board of Education (1954) and 
Swann v. CMS (1971) created a policy environment to integrate public schools by busing in 
larger districts.  However, busing students away from neighborhood schools was politically 
unpopular because of the amount of time children spent on school buses and the loss of 
neighborhood schools and the community attachments they helped to create.  Since the early 
1990s, elementary and secondary school attendance policies in the United States as a whole, 
but especially in the South, have gradually been changing to increase school choice options, 
often as a means to encourage integration. This is arguably a result of several key 
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desegregation court cases forbidding the use of race in school assignment, which restricted 
busing programs to integrate schools (Boger 2000), as well as in response to parental demand 
for more choices.   
The impact of school choice on educational goals and outcomes is uncertain.  On the 
one hand, proponents of school choice argue that it liberates poor children by lifting the 
restrictions that limit them to poor quality schools with poor educational outcomes and by 
encouraging administrators to improve overall school quality (Hoxby 2003a; Peterson 2005).  
On the other hand, critics of school choice argue that it aggravates the growing racial and 
socioeconomic segregation found in public schools, potentially negatively impacting equity 
goals such as integrated schools and equal access to quality education for all students (Henig 
1994).  Empirical studies of the impact of school choice on racial and socioeconomic 
segregation are limited both in number and in scope, in part due to the variety of school 
choice policies.  Controlled choice is one type of school choice proposed to voluntarily 
integrate school districts.  The study presented here examines whether the incremental 
implementation of a district-wide controlled choice student assignment plan impacted the 
racial and socioeconomic segregation in the school district. 
Controlled choice attendance plans were initially implemented in San Lucie County, 
FL, and Boston, MA, in 1989 (Willie, Edwards, and Alves 2002) and are supported by a 
coalition of conservative and liberal policymakers—conservatives because the plans 
introduce more elements of the free market into the public schools, and liberals because the 
plans allow school boards who feel that diversity is an important educational purpose, to 
make student assignments that support diversity.  The key components of a controlled choice 
plan are student diversity, school choice, and school improvement for the least attractive 
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schools (Willie, Edwards, and Alves 2002).  Under controlled choice, the school district is 
first divided into one or more attendance zones, depending on the size of the student 
population and the district’s geographic area.  Students and parents then rank their choices of 
the elementary or middle schools within their attendance zone and district officials match 
students with a school based on their rankings, the composition of students within the 
schools, and other district priorities.  The district is then responsible for providing 
transportation.   
The literature on school choice policies suggests that the details of implementation 
determine the success of the program (Fiske and Ladd 2000; Willie, Edwards, and Alves 
2002; Witte 2000).  In order to include those details, which often vary dramatically between 
districts, most studies of controlled choice are case studies, including this one.  Any 
generalization to a larger population depends on the similarity with the local policies and 
situation.  With that caveat, this case study will contribute to the school choice literature and 
guide future efforts to improve education policy by clarifying the relationship between a 
student assignment policy and resulting racial and socioeconomic segregation.  The question 
asked in this paper is whether a controlled choice assignment policy increased the racial and 
economic homogeneity in the school district.  Because the policy was planned and phased in 
over a five-year period in the county under examination, the impact of the attendance policy 
may be more easily identified than in districts where the policy was implemented in the 
entire district at the same time.  
This study is a significant advance over past research both because of access to more 
comprehensive longitudinal data and a more robust research design: it is a multi-level 
longitudinal study that measures racial and socioeconomic segregation before, during, and 
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after the implementation of the controlled choice policy in a single district; the 
implementation was phased in over a five-year period; and several other comparable districts 
with alternative school assignment policies are included in the model as comparison groups.   
The goal of the study is to estimate the effect of implementing the controlled choice 
student assignment plan on the school-level racial and socioeconomic segregation in the 
district.  First, I review the literature on school choice theory and critiques.  Second, I 
describe the district and the circumstances leading to the implementation of the controlled 
choice policy.  Third, I outline the research design and the process of selecting comparison 
groups.  Next, I introduce the model and discuss the empirical results.  The concluding 
section summarizes the findings and discusses directions for future policy decisions and 
research. 
School Choice Theory and Critiques 
School choice is widely viewed as a means for introducing student options and 
competition into the public educational system, potentially ameliorating problems such as 
bureaucratic complexity (Chubb and Moe 1990), monopolistic structure (Peterson 1990), 
lack of innovation, weak community ties, lack of diversity (Coleman 1990), and poor 
educational outcomes (National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983), as well as a 
lack of equity between races and classes.  Equity arguments in favor of school choice are 
often based on what one scholar calls a “liberation model” whereby poor and minority 
children are given a means to escape the trap of inferior, poverty-stricken public schools 
(Archbald 2004).  This liberation model is echoed in other research.  For example, Hoxby 
(2003b) suggests that school choice will eliminate the link between neighborhood 
segregation and housing values on the one hand and school quality on the other.  Godwin, 
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Kemerer, Martinez and Ruderman (1998) wrote that liberating low-income students from 
poor quality schools would increase their potential for higher educational outcomes.   
School choice researchers also rely on a market competition model and Hirschman’s 
(1970) organizational theory of exit and voice.  For example, Chubb and Moe (1988) argue 
that by allowing the parents/consumers to choose a school (or increase their exit options), the 
administrators will be more receptive to their requests (voice) and thus reduce bureaucracy 
and improve efficiency and innovation.  In other words, the incentive to maintain or increase 
market share by exchanging resources without diminishing educational quality may reveal 
savings in non-teaching areas such as overhead and bureaucracy.  Despite Weiss’s (1998) 
argument that parents do not speak with a single, clear voice regarding what is important in 
education, this model is appealing to consumers who are accustomed to choosing among 
multiple goods and services. 
One of the primary critiques of school choice is that choice, either through 
insufficient information or a preference for segregated neighborhood schools by parents, has 
the potential to exacerbate existing racial and socioeconomic segregation in public schools as 
it fundamentally alters how students are distributed among schools within a district 
(Archbald 2000).  Several studies suggest that choice may lead to segregation (Archbald 
2004; Godwin and Kemerer 2002), but others suggest that the segregation may be the result 
of factors other than choice policies (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005).  We know little 
about the effects of school choice on racial and socioeconomic segregation. 
However, racial segregation in public schools, especially in the South, has arguably 
been increasing by several measures (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005; Orfield and Yun 
1999).  The causes of this “resegregation” are unclear.  Orfield and Lee (2005) suggest that it 
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may be a result of changing demographics, urban sprawl, and declining inner cities, or the 
dismantling of desegregation policies and increasing public school choice.  The appeal of the 
controlled choice student assignment policy is that it combines potentially positive outcomes 
projected by the market competition and liberation models with a means to limit the 
unintended consequences of school choice as district priorities are expressed through 
centralized student assignment. 
Demographic Changes 
Due to the correlation between race and poverty, demographic changes in poverty 
concentrations may be correlated with changes in racial demographics in schools.  For 
example, a national study using 1990-2000 census data found that concentrated poverty in 
the U.S. decreased dramatically during the 1990s (Jargowsky 2003).  In the study, the 
number of people living in high-poverty neighborhoods—defined as having a poverty rate at 
40% or higher—decreased by 24%, or 2.5 million people.  This occurred most dramatically 
in the South and Midwest.  Jargowsky also found that concentrated poverty declined among 
all racial and ethnic groups, especially African Americans where the percentage of poor 
black individuals living in high-poverty neighborhoods declined from 30% to 19%.  
Jargowsky’s (2003) study suggests that general changes in neighborhood demographics 
between 1990 and 2000 in the South may have led to decreases in school homogeneity.  
Similarly, a recent study by Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2005) found that while the average 
level of segregation in large Southern school districts has not changed since 1995, public 
schools have become more nonwhite due to the general increase in the nonwhite percentage 
in the student population. 
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While there is a substantial amount of research examining school choice and 
segregation, there is little research looking for the policy impact of a controlled school choice 
plan on subsequent racial and socioeconomic segregation.  Fiske’s (2002) descriptive 
analysis of the impact of controlled choice in Cambridge, MA found during a period of racial 
balancing that only two schools fell outside the district guideline that schools be within ten 
percent of the district-wide average of 40 percent white students.  However, case studies of 
magnet school choice in two locations found racial implications in school choice decisions.  
Saporito (2003) found that in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania white families avoided schools with 
higher percentages of non-white students after controlling for test scores, safety, and poverty 
rates.  Similarly, Henig (1995) found in Montgomery County, Maryland that white families 
tended to request transfers into schools with lower percentages of minority students, and 
minority families were more likely to opt for schools in low-income neighborhoods.  In a 
national study, Archbald  (2004) used NCES data and demographically controlled 
comparison groups to examine the relationship between magnet school choice and 
socioeconomic stratification.  The author found no difference in socioeconomic segregation 
between school districts with magnet-based choice and those without choice.  The current 
study extends this school choice research by using a longitudinal growth model and carefully 
selected comparison school districts to examine the relationship between implementing the 
Choice Plan and the racial and socioeconomic segregation within a school district in North 
Carolina.    
School Choice in the Target District 
 The Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Public Schools (WSF) is the 107th largest school 
district in the United States, the 5th largest in North Carolina.  The student population was 
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approximately 44,600—52% Caucasian and 48% minority students—during the 2000-2001 
school year.  The 408 square-mile county is in the northern Piedmont area of North Carolina.  
The total population was 306,067 in 2000, the fourth most populous county in the state.  In 
2000, a little over half of the population lived in Winston-Salem (185,776), while the 
remainder lived in outlying municipalities (69,882) or rural areas (50,409) (NC Center for 
Statistics, 24 April 2006).  Census data show that the increase in minority population 
between 1990 and 2000 was over 44%, with approximately 20,000 minority students in 2000.  
Much of this increase has been due to growth in Hispanic residents and students.  
In 1981 the Winston-Salem/Forsyth County School District was declared unitary, or 
no longer under a court-ordered desegregation plan (1981).  At that time WSF used a 1971 
court-ordered pupil assignment plan that included five grade levels and required that students 
change schools every two years, more or less alternating between urban and suburban 
schools, some traditionally white, others traditionally black.  The district used school 
pairings, clusters, satellite zones, and bus transportation to achieve racially integrated 
schools.  Criticisms of the frequent school changes in this plan led to a similar plan with three 
school levels—elementary, middle, and high school—implemented in 1984-85 after the 
school district had been declared unitary.  At that point, five elementary schools in WSF 
were significantly outside the district goal of each school’s minority representation being 
within ±5% of the minority representation in the district, and they were considered 
“neighborhood schools” and supported by their respective communities (Punger 1994). 
During the early 1990s the Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education 
(Board) began developing a new pupil assignment plan in order to address several issues: a 
projected increase in the number of students and other demographic changes in the 
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communities, increasing racial imbalances in the schools, parental interest in reducing busing 
and providing elementary schools in black residential neighborhoods, and improving student 
achievement.  Following the example of controlled choice plans in Florida and 
Massachusetts (Willie, Edwards, and Alves 2002), the Board developed a controlled choice 
plan where elementary and middle schools within a geographic zone would have a theme or 
magnet program to attract students—for example, science and mathematics, year-round 
traditional academics, languages, etc.  The aim of the plan’s architects was to integrate all 
students in the district on a voluntary basis by using parental choice and involvement as a 
means to make systemic changes and improvements in the overall quality of education 
provided by WSF.  The racial composition of each projected zone in 1993 was within 4-5% 
of the district-wide minority composition (39%) with the exception of two elementary school 
zones with 25% and 33% minority students, and one middle school zone with just over 50% 
minority students. 
The implementation of the controlled choice plan in WSF began with one elementary 
school zone during the 1995-1996 school year.  One additional elementary school zone was 
implemented each of the next two years.  In the 1998-99 school year, one additional 
elementary school zone and three middle school zones were implemented.  Finally, in 2000, 
the remainder of the zones were implemented—four additional elementary school zones and 
three additional middle school zones.  Although initially the district officials considered race 
in making school assignments in order to maintain desegregated schools, the Board was 
counseled by the U.S. Office of Civil Rights to stop using race in pupil assignment decisions 
following the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals decisions in Eisenberg v. Montgomery County 
Maryland Public Schools (1999) and Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board (1999).  As of 
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the 2001-02 school year, racial balance between schools was no longer considered in making 
student assignments.   
The two primary periods of choice for students are when they are entering 
kindergarten and 6th grade and must choose an elementary or middle school.  While students 
may choose to attend any high school in the district, transportation is not provided for high 
school students outside their residential area.  Elementary school parents rank their three top 
choices of the five schools in their zone, and students are then assigned to a school based on 
the preference rules: residential area, siblings, and children of school employees.  A failure to 
make choices results in an assignment based on a random assignment.  There also are 
grandfathering and hardship transfer rules. School capacity limits the number of students that 
may be assigned to each school (“Assignment of Pupils” 2002).  Approximately 30% of the 
students in each elementary school choose to attend a school outside their residential area.  
Sixty-five percent of kindergarten parents choose a school during the choice period, 35% 
register for school late and are assigned to a school based on choice and school capacity.  Ten 
percent of 6th grade returning students fail to return documentation choosing a middle school 
and are assigned a middle school by the school district.  Students who apply to an 
oversubscribed school are entered into a lottery for the remaining openings after the 
preference rules have been applied (Holleman 2005).  
Ten years after the initial implementation, the impact of the Choice Plan is unclear.  
Results from a telephone survey conducted in August 2000 indicate both African American 
and Caucasian parents are almost equally satisfied with the public school system (Martin 
2005).  Furthermore, one school board member said that she had “never heard a parent say I 
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hate the redistricting.”  She also said that “it works and parents are happy, whether they’re 
black, white, or purple” (Tackaberry 2002). 
While the specific circumstances surrounding the implementation of the WSF 
controlled choice plan will never be duplicated exactly, this study will be a valuable addition 
to the school choice policy literature, as it provides important information on the impact of a 
controlled school choice plan implemented systematically district-wide, on racial and 
socioeconomic segregation within the district. 
Research Design 
Data 
The data used for this analysis are from the North Carolina Education Research Data 
Center (NCERDC).  The NCERDC is a repository for all public education data in North 
Carolina.  The data used in this analysis were limited to regular public elementary and middle 
schools.  The WSF Choice Plan allowed more choice in elementary and middle schools than 
in high schools, where the students could attend any high school in the district but 
transportation was not provided.  Furthermore, elementary and middle schools, as they are 
smaller, tend to be more racially segregated than high schools due to residential segregation.   
While there are several possible measures of racial isolation and segregation 
(Archbald 2000; Clotfelter 1999; James and Taeuber 1985), this analysis uses a racial 
imbalance measure at the school level similar to the dissimilarity index used at the district 
level.  This measure captures the relative percentage of minorities in each school compared 
to the district percentage, or how the students are distributed throughout the district.  The 
segregation measure used in this analysis is the absolute value of the difference between the 
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percentage of minority students at the school and the district, indicating the deviation of the 
schools from the district measure: 
(1) MRij=|MSij - MDi|
where MSij is the percentage of minority students in school j at time i and MDi is the 
percentage of minority students in school j’s district at time i.  The WSF goal in 1981 when it 
was declared unitary was to have each school within ± 5% of the district measure of minority 
students.  Other cutoffs that have been used are ± 10% (Fiske 2002) and ±20%, the WSF 
guideline under the Choice Plan. 
Available school data provide incomplete information to determine the 
socioeconomic status of the students; therefore, the percentage of students who used free 
lunch (28-41%) is used as a proxy to measure socioeconomic status and create a measure of 
socioeconomic segregation: 
(2) PRij=|PSij-PDi|
where PSij is the percentage of students using free lunch in school j at time i and PDi is the 
percentage of students using free lunch in school j’s district at time i. 
Comparison Groups 
The goal of this study is to estimate whether the racial and socioeconomic segregation 
in the WSF schools was higher than it would have been if they had not implemented the 
Choice Plan.  The research design problem is that we cannot observe the district both 
implementing the Choice Plan and not implementing the Choice Plan.  Ideally, schools 
would be randomly assigned to different treatment and control groups in order to minimize 
potential bias from unmeasured as well as measured characteristics.  However, in this 
research it would be impractical to have student assignment policies vary randomly by 
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school.  While the ideal research design is experimental, an empirical test of this hypothesis 
must be conducted with a quasi-experimental research design (Black 1999; Cook and 
Campbell 1979).   
The potential difficulty in a non-random research design is selection bias.  With a 
random design we can be reasonably sure that the difference between treatment and controls 
is not due to an unknown characteristic, but due to the treatment itself.  We can confidently 
say that with the exception of the intervention, members of the control group are subject to 
the same forces as members of the treatment group.  With a quasi-experimental research 
design only one outcome can be observed for any particular school, thus raising issues of 
potential bias.  Schools in other districts are not subject to the same forces as schools in 
WSF.  However, by carefully selecting comparison groups, this bias is minimized as much as 
is feasible. 
In evaluations where random assignment is not possible, it is important to establish a 
counterfactual, or what amount of segregation would have happened in WSF in the absence 
of the Choice Plan.  That counterfactual, or segregation level, would depend on WSF’s 
student assignment policy.  The decision made by WSF’s school board was not between 
school choice and an ideal nonsegregated state, but between multiple policy options 
(Archbald 2000).  In this particular instance, there were several possibilities.  One option 
could have been to continue busing students for integration, which may have increased 
segregation only slightly, but was not politically feasible.  A second option would be to adopt 
a neighborhood school assignment policy where students would be assigned to the school 
closest to their homes, which would have increased segregation dramatically due to 
residential segregation.  A third option would be to adopt a policy to integrate schools using 
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school choice and magnet schools, which would have resulted in a level of segregation 
between the first two options.  In summary, the counterfactual, or what would have happened 
in the absence of the Choice Plan, was most likely an increase in segregation. 
Each of the student assignment policies mentioned above was used in other urban 
districts in North Carolina at the time of this study.  Using these districts as a comparison 
group does not resolve the selection bias.  There may be unknown characteristics in each 
district leading to the implementation of these different school assignment policies that may 
also impact the outcome of interest, or segregation with the districts’ schools. 
While using comparison groups in lieu of random assignment and control groups is a 
second-best situation, and relying on only one identification strategy to address selection bias 
has been shown to provide unreliable estimates (Hollister and Hill 1995), using multiple 
identification strategies to select the comparison groups will result in the most reliable 
estimates available.  The first identification strategy is to statistically match other North 
Carolina school districts to the intervention district by similar base populations and 
demographic changes between 1990 and 2000 using U.S. Census Data.  The second 
identification strategy is to consult with practitioners in the school districts to learn which 
districts they used in comparisons.  The third identification strategy is to use multiple 
comparison groups as a sensitivity analysis.  Finally, multilevel longitudinal methods have 
been shown to have distinct advantages over standard econometric methods in 
nonexperimental program evaluations (Gordon and Heinrich 2004) where experimental 
evaluations are not feasible.     
One of the contributions of this research project is the longitudinal analysis of a 
controlled choice policy using multiple comparison groups, thus minimizing the potential 
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bias in a quasi-experimental research design.  As mentioned above, two possible comparison 
groups are used in the analysis in order to provide a sensitivity analysis.  The first is based on 
the assumption that in the absence of the Choice Plan, WSF would have adopted school 
assignment policies similar to Guilford County School District, a neighboring urban school 
district that would have been subject to similar economic and demographic changes during 
the time period.  The Guilford County school district merged with two adjoining city school 
districts in 1992.  The school assignment policies for the cities, but not the county, included 
busing of students to maintain racial diversity, and this practice continued with slight changes 
throughout the study period.  The advantage of this comparison group is simplicity—one 
treatment district, one comparison district.  The disadvantage is that Guilford County School 
District was not static.  The school assignment policies were officially consistent during the 
study period; however, they may have been influenced in practice by the 1992 merger of the 
city and county school districts. 
The second comparison group utilizes a combination, or average, of five other urban 
school districts in North Carolina.  This comparison group is based on the assumption that if 
WSF had not adopted the Choice Plan, it would have adopted school assignment policies or 
practices that would have had an effect similar to the average impact of these other school 
districts.  These urban school districts (Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Cumberland, Durham, 
Guilford, and Wake) were chosen based on similar base populations and demographic 
changes between 1990 and 2000 to WSF, using U.S. Census Data and a logit regression 
model;1 as well as on the advice of practitioners in the school districts. 
The school assignment policies in these districts changed during the time period of 
the study (see Appendix A for a timeline).  In three of the districts, their school assignment 
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policies were based on neighborhood schools, with some busing to maintain school diversity.  
Two of these districts, Guilford and Durham, merged their county and city school districts in 
the early 1990s.  Guilford officially maintained the previous student assignment policies until 
the late 1990s.  Durham, however, instituted a student assignment policy based on 
neighborhood schools, with the option to transfer.  Two larger districts, Wake County and 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS), had student assignment policies that relied heavily 
on busing to maintain racial diversity during the early 1990s.  In the mid 1990s, an 
assignment policy based on maintaining socioeconomic balance within the district was 
implemented in Wake County, and in 2001 a controlled school choice policy similar to 
WSF’s was implemented in CMS.  The final school district, Cumberland, is arguably very 
different from WSF in that it contains a military base and thus a more transient population.  
However, census data showed similar demographic composition and changes compared to 
WSF between 1990 and 2000. 
One potential limitation with this study is that while the comparison districts were 
matched at the district level, the analysis is conducted at the school level.  The option of 
using propensity score matching was not feasible in this case, due to the difficulty of 
matching schools within districts, within zones.  However, an examination of the random 
effects at the school level indicated that the effect of matching comparison groups at one 
level and conducting the analysis at another level did not significantly impact the analysis.2
Hypothesis 
Initial data exploration indicates that schools in the subject county have become more 
racially homogenous between 1990 and 2000.  As previously discussed, one factor 
potentially influencing this is the change in county demographics, as illustrated in Table 1.  
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The number of Caucasians in Forsyth County increased by 6% between 1990 and 2000, and 
the number of African Americans increased by 19%.  However, there was a large influx of 
Hispanics during the same time period, an increase of over 900%, from 0.7% in 1990 to 6% 
in 2000.  The percentage of minorities in all the school districts, as shown by Table 2, 
steadily increased during the study period.  It is not clear if increasing segregation within the 
districts is a result of changing demographics or school choice student assignment policies.   
Given the conflicting research and polemic literature regarding school choice and 
racial and socioeconomic segregation, a non-directional hypothesis—that schools have not 
become racially and socioeconomically segregated as a result of the change in attendance 
policies—is suggested. 
Models 
As the Choice Plan was implemented over time, this study uses hierarchical linear 
models (HLM) as an analytical technique to test the hypothesis.  Multilevel approaches can 
produce a more precise understanding of the complex, multi-level relationships (Heinrich and 
Lynn 2000) that exist in education policy situations.  They also provide flexibility with time-
varying covariates and missing data, and correct for serial autocorrelation by including 
random effects in the models (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Singer and Willett 2003).  The 
intraclass correlation coefficient calculated from the unconditional means model provides the 
relative magnitude of within-school, or over time, and between-school variation and 
summarizes the size of the residual autocorrelation.  Analysis showed that as much as 59 
percent of the total variance in segregation outcomes was between schools rather than over 
time within schools, thus showing that a multilevel model was a more appropriate method 
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than a conventional regression model.  SAS was used to estimate all the models presented in 
this study. 
In this study, the changes over time in segregation at the school level were 
investigated using an “intercepts- and slopes-as-outcomes” model specification.  In the HLM 
model, the changes in school level segregation over time are modeled as a function of time 
while controlling for districts.  At level one, the segregation of school j at time i is 
represented as depending linearly on time: 
(3) ijijjjij timeY  ++= 10
where Yij is a measure of racial or socioeconomic segregation in each school; the subscript (i) 
indicates time (1992-2003; or 0-10); the subscript (j) denotes the schools and allows each 
school to have a unique intercept and slope for each of the level one predictors, and the 
residual Zij is assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean and a constant variance.  
The errors within schools are expected to be heteroscedastic and correlated over time, and 
identically distributed across schools (Singer and Willett 2003).3
At level two, the intercept and slopes of level-1 coefficients are expressed as a linear 
function of each school within a specific district: 
(4) jjj STWakeCMSGuilDurCumb 0060504030201000 µ +++++++=
(5) jjj STWakeCMSGuilDurCumb 1161514131211101 µ +++++++=
where each district is an indicator variable for school j with WSF as the reference category; 
ST is the average student-teacher ratio for each school j; and [0j and [1j are random effects 
associated with each school within a district that are assumed to be normally distributed with 
a zero mean and a constant variance.  Model testing indicated that the average student-
53 
teacher ratio at the school level, a proxy for school-level finances, did not contribute 
significantly to the model so it was not included in the final model.   
 The second model is similar to the first, but instead of controlling for districts, 
schools implementing the policy within WSF are compared to schools both in WSF and in 
the other districts not implementing the policy.  The level one equation for the second model 
is: 
 (6) ijijjijjjij policytimeY  +++= 210
where Yij is a measure of racial or socioeconomic segregation in each school; the subscript (i) 
indicates time (1992-2003; or 0-10); the subscript (j) denotes the schools and allows each 
school to have a unique intercept and slope; policy is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the 
Choice Plan was used in school j at time i, otherwise 0, as the zones were phased in between 
1995 and 2000; and the residual Zij is assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean 
and a constant variance across schools.  The effect of the policy is expected to be time-
varying as increasing numbers of parents become accustomed to the policy and change 
schools.  The second level equations include only intercepts and random effects associated 
with each school: 
 (7) \0j=]00+µ0j; \1j=]10+µ1j; \2j=]20+µ2j 
Again, the random effects are assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean and a 
constant variance.4
The dependent variables MR and PR are the natural logarithms of percentages.  The 
key difference between a dependent variable that is a percentage and one that is the natural 
log of that percentage is in the predicted values.  Predicted values of a log transformation 
approach 0, but never exceed it.  Therefore, they can never be out of boundaries, unlike one 
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that is a percentage (White, Biddlecom, and Guo 1993).  However, predicted values must be 
interpreted as in a logistic regression. 
 As discussed above, similar studies looking at the impact of school choice on 
segregation primarily use descriptive methods (e.g., Archbald 2004; Fiske 2002; Henig 
1995).  This study extends those because it measures the segregation within the district 
before, during, and after the implementation, includes multiple comparison groups, and 
methods that separate the initial implementation effect from the slope, or change over time.  
 
Results 
Descriptive Results 
Measures of racial and socioeconomic segregation at the district level indicate that 
with the exception of Durham, racial and socioeconomic segregation increased in all of the 
districts during the study period.  Figure 1 shows that the dissimilarity index—the percentage 
of minority students that would need to be transferred in order for the racial balance at each 
school to match that of the district—increased in all of the districts except Durham, but most 
dramatically in WSF.  Of all the districts, Wake County was the most consistently integrated.  
Wake County began busing students for socioeconomic, rather than racial, integration in the 
mid-1990s, and shows the smallest increase in racial segregation during the study period.  
However, another way of measuring segregation may show one reason Wake County is 
consistently lower.  As shown in Figure 2, the exposure index—the percentage of white 
students in the average minority student’s school—decreased in all the districts during the 
study period.  This measure reflects both the overall composition and the distribution of 
students by race within the districts.  Wake County, with the lowest percentage of minority 
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students, had the highest exposure index, illustrating that exposure to white students is easier 
to maintain in districts with fewer minority students. 
As discussed above, the percentage of students receiving free lunch is frequently used 
as a proxy to measure poverty.  The percentage of students using free lunch in the districts 
ranged from 16% to 35% (Table 2).  Using the percentage of students receiving free lunch is 
a stricter definition of poverty than the percentage of students receiving free and reduced 
lunch.  Figure 3 shows that over the study period the dissimilarity index—the percentage of 
students using free lunch that would need to be transferred in order for the percentage of 
students using free lunch at each school to match that of the district—increased in WSF 
compared to the other districts, which remained relatively static with the exception of 
Durham and Mecklenburg.  Finally, Figure 4 shows that the exposure index—the percentage 
of students not using free lunch in the school attended by the average student using free 
lunch—decreased in WSF during the study period compared to the other districts. 
Multi-level Analysis 
Racial Segregation
Table 3 shows the gamma coefficients from the HLM analysis of the minority result 
(MR) for selected models of both comparison groups. The Unconditional Means Model (not 
reported) fitted to the outcome variables produced estimates for the variation within-school 
and between-schools and for the variance components of the parameters that differ among 
schools.  The one fixed effect, for both comparison groups, estimated the grand mean of MR 
across all years.  Interpreting the gamma coefficients directly is very difficult since the 
outcome variable is the natural log of a percent.  The predicted values of the models will be 
discussed below.  However, the intercepts for all models were significant at the p<0.001 
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level.  These intercepts indicated that on average the percentage of minority students in 
individual schools was not the same as the district percentage of minority students.   
The Unconditional Means Model allows us to evaluate numerically the relative 
magnitude of the within-school and between-school variance components (Singer and Willett 
2003).  The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) describes the proportion of the total 
outcome variation that lies between schools.   The ICC for the first comparison group is 59% 
and the second is 58%, indicating that most of the total variation in school minority 
representation is attributable to differences between the schools rather than within the schools 
over time.  Another role of the ICC is to summarize the size of the residual autocorrelation in 
the composite Unconditional Means Model.  Thus for each school, the average correlation 
between any pair of composite residuals is the ICC (0.59 or 0.58).  
The Unconditional Growth Model (not reported) included time as the only predictor 
of between-school differences for MR.  The fixed effects, ]00 and ]01, estimated the starting 
point and slope of the population average change trajectory; however, the gamma 
coefficients are not easily interpreted.  The level 1 residual variance, 2 , was 0.199 (0.315), 
summarizing the scatter of each school’s data around its own linear change trajectory.  As the 
level 1 residual variance for the Unconditional Growth Model was 0.16-0.20 less than for the 
Unconditional Means Model, 16-20% of the within-school variation in school minority 
representation was systematically associated with linear time.  Also, because the null 
hypothesis for the variance component can be rejected, we know that some important within-
school variation still remains, suggesting that the model fit could be improved by introducing 
substantive predictors into the level-1 submodel.  The population covariance between true 
initial status and true change is quantified by 01 , -0.092 (-0.079).  Reexpressing the 
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covariance as a correlation coefficient (-0.73 and -0.65) suggests that the relationship 
between the true rate of change in MR and its initial status was negative and not small.  In 
other words, schools that were more segregated—further from the district measures—at the 
beginning of the study increased in segregation less rapidly over time, than schools that were 
initially closer to the district average. 
In Model C, indicator variables are included for the districts, with WSF as the 
reference district.  While Wake and CMS, in the multiple district comparison, did not have 
significantly different intercepts from WSF, the other districts’ intercepts were significantly 
different.  This is consistent with the initial policies in those three districts of busing for 
racial integration.  The rate of change, or the slope, for all districts was significantly different 
from the rate of change for WSF.  The predicted values for each district (Table 4) suggested 
that with the exception of Durham, segregation in each district was slowly increasing during 
the study period.  A graph of these predicted values (not shown) closely replicates the 
changes in the minority dissimilarity index shown in Figure 1.  In WSF, the model suggested 
that the average school was within ± 6% of the district-wide measure of minority students in 
1992.  By 2002, the model predicted the average WSF school to be within ± 24% of the 
district-wide measure. 
In Model D, the time-varying predictor of policy was included with time in both the 
single district and multiple district comparisons.  This policy main effects model assumed 
that school j’s value of MR at time i depended on: the number of years since the policy was 
enacted; the school’s contemporaneous value of policy; and three school-specific residuals.  
The intercept (]00) refers to a school at the beginning of the time period where the policy was 
not implemented.  Adding the policy variable to the unconditional growth model reduced the 
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magnitude of the within-school variance component by 1-3%.  In other words, the time-
varying policy explained just over 1-3% of the variation in MR.  Predicted values based on 
this model (Table 7) suggest that implementing the school choice policy led to an immediate 
increase in school racial segregation, as measured by the deviation from the district average, 
by ± 6-8%.  For example, if the district average was 50% minority students and the average 
school deviated from that district measure by ± 10%, implementing the school choice policy 
would increase the range to approximately 33% to 67%.  Over a ten year period, the 
deviation from the district average will increase to ± 25%, resulting in schools with 25% 
minority students and schools with 75% minority students for the example above.  
Ultimately, a district that began a school choice policy with the average school within ± 10% 
of the district-wide percentage of minority students could potentially have the average school 
within ± 25% of the district-wide percent of minority students within 10 years. 
Socioeconomic Segregation
While poverty and race are highly correlated, the same models discussed above with 
the poverty measure as the dependent variable suggest the school choice policy did not have 
the same impact on socioeconomic segregation.  Table 5 shows the gamma coefficients from 
the HLM analysis of the poverty result (PR) for both comparison groups.  The baseline 
model (unreported) indicated the results of fitting the Unconditional Means Model to the 
outcome variables.  The intercepts for both comparison groups were similar in size, although 
difficult to interpret, and significant at the p<0.001 level.  These intercepts indicated that on 
average the percentage of students using free lunch at the school level was not the same as 
the district percentage.  The intraclass correlation coefficient for both comparison groups was 
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52%, indicating that just over half of the total variation in school poverty representation was 
attributable to differences between the schools rather than within the schools. 
In the Unconditional Growth Model, time was included as a predictor of between-
school differences for PR.  This model presents the results of fitting the unconditional growth 
model to the outcomes, where time was the only predictor.  The fixed effects, ]00 and ]01,
estimated the starting point and slope of the population average change trajectory.   
In Model C, indicator variables were included for all districts, with WSF as the 
reference category.  Durham and Guilford were the only districts in the multiple district 
comparison that were significantly different at the p<0.001 level from WSF.  However, the 
rate of change, or the slope, for all districts was significantly different from WSF, although 
only significant at the 0.10 level for Wake.  The predicted values for each district (Table 6) 
suggest that with the exception of Durham and Cumberland, socioeconomic segregation in 
each district was gradually increasing during the study period.  In WSF, the model suggests 
that the average school was within ± 6% of the district-wide measure of socioeconomic 
segregation in 1992.  By 2002, the model predicted the average WSF school to be within ± 
22% of the district-wide measure.  Again, as with the MR model, at the beginning of the 
study period, the distribution of WSF schools was closest to their district-wide percent of 
students using free lunch and at the end of the study period the distribution was the furthest 
of all the districts from their district-wide measure. 
In Model D, the time varying predictor of policy was included with time, thus 
controlling for schools using the controlled choice policy but not controlling for district.  
This policy main effects model assumed that school j’s value of PR at time i depended on: 
the number of years since the policy was enacted; the school’s contemporaneous value of 
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policy; and three school-specific residuals.  The intercept (]00) refers to a school at the 
beginning of the time period where the policy is not implemented.  Adding the policy 
variable to the unconditional growth model reduced the magnitude of the within-school 
variance component by 3-16%.  In other words, the time-varying policy explained just over 
3% of the variation in PR compared to the average district, and 16% compared to just the 
Guilford district.  Predicted values based on this model (Table 7) suggest that implementing 
the school choice policy led to an initial increase in socioeconomic segregation, as measured 
by the deviation from the district average, of ± 4-6%.  In other words, if the district average 
was 50% of students using free lunch, and prior to implementing the choice plan, ± 8%, or 
between 42% and 58% of the students in the average school used free lunch, then 
implementing the school choice plan would increase the deviation from the district measure 
to approximately 37% to 63%.  Over ten years the deviation of schools from the district 
average would increase an additional ± 5%, leaving the schools in the above example with 
between 32% and 68% of the students using free lunch.  Thus the schools are becoming more 
segregated by socioeconomic status within the district as students using free lunch 
congregate in some schools, while other schools have fewer of these low-income students. 
Summary and Conclusions 
School choice is a potentially divisive educational policy issue and this study 
provides an important contribution to that literature.  Policymakers and administrators are 
split over the benefits and costs of school choice.  This study of controlled choice supports 
previous research showing that school segregation is increasing in public schools (Orfield 
and Yun 1999).  However, in addition to the overall increases in segregation occurring in all 
the districts, the controlled choice school assignment policy in WSF contributed significantly 
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to further resegregating the public schools.  Results from the HLM models suggest that 
implementing a controlled school choice policy in a racially balanced school district (all of 
the schools within ± 5% of the district-wide measure) will likely result in the average 
elementary/middle school within a district initially deviating from the district average by an 
additional ± 6-8%.  Changes over time will increase this range of divergence from the district 
average to ± 25%.  This increase due to controlled choice will most likely be smaller in 
districts with greater initial segregation such as Guilford or Cumberland. 
This study also shows that a controlled choice student assignment policy may have a 
smaller impact on the distribution of students using free lunch than on the distribution of 
minority students (initial deviation of ± 4-6% rather than ± 6-8% from the district-wide 
measure).  These results are consistent with the hypothesis that race may be used as a proxy 
for school quality when other measures of quality are unavailable (Fiske and Ladd 2000), so 
it is possible that parents could be intentionally avoiding schools that are perceived as 
“minority.”  Racial and socioeconomic segregation, while correlated, may be influenced 
differently by school choice policies as the minority status of students attending a school is 
potentially more visible than their socioeconomic status. 
All of the school districts included in this study have become more racially 
segregated since the late 1990s, making it clear that the policy choice is not between racially 
segregated and racially integrated schools, but between policies resulting in greater or lesser 
degrees of segregation.  Given this trend, other policy goals and values should be considered 
as part of this policy decision.  Controlled choice has been promoted as the student 
assignment policy best able to balance competing policy goals and values such as parental 
choice, potential community involvement in terms of setting district-wide balancing policy, 
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and equity issues (Kahlenberg 2001).  However, as this study shows, a controlled choice 
school assignment policy without an integration policy will result in segregrated schools. 
One alternative, a fundamental part of the original controlled choice plan, would be to 
balance student assignment either racially or by socioeconomic status.  Currently the ability 
to assign students based on race is not an option in this district due to the 4th Circuit Court of 
Appeals decisions.  Alternatively, WSF could balance student assignment by socioeconomic 
status.  While this is a viable alternative that Wake County and others are using, there are two 
major concerns.  First, Wake County’s policy is to have no more than 40% of students in any 
school eligible for free or reduced price lunch.  Given that fewer than 20% of the students in 
Wake County are eligible, the goal is feasible.  As over 40% of the students in WSF are 
eligible for free or reduced price lunch, the proportionate goal in WSF would be to have no 
more than 62% of the students in any school eligible for free or reduced price lunch—well 
over the suggested tipping point (Kahlenberg 2001).  The second major concern is that given 
the slightly greater impact of the school choice assignment policy on racial segregation, 
balancing by socioeconomic status is not going to achieve the same integration results as 
balancing by race.  However, at this time it is the most feasible policy alternative. 
There are several limitations to this study.  Although five districts were used as 
comparison groups, it is primarily a case study of one district, and only grades K-8 were 
included.  Another limitation is that this study evaluated policy changes that occurred in 
school districts between five and ten years ago.  Changes in policy documents, when 
available, do not necessarily indicate what actually occurred or was enforced.  Finally, the 
data cannot show whether the resulting racial and socioeconomic segregation was a 
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consequence of consumer choices to attend segregated schools or a consequence of 
competition failure due to incomplete information on the part of the decisionmakers.   
When WSF first implemented the Choice Plan there was concern that it would 
resegregate the public schools after years of operating under a court-ordered desegregation 
plan.  The results from this study provide legitimacy for that concern.  The schools in WSF 
have become resegregated, in part due to demographic changes such as increasing 
percentages of minority students and in part due to the school choice plan.  Despite extensive 
research, the effect of attending segregated schools is complex and unclear (Schofield 1995); 
however, segregation is widely viewed as a barrier to equal education opportunities (Orfield 
and Lee 2005).  The advantage of the controlled choice student assignment plan is that 
policymakers trying to expand opportunities for choice and community involvement can 
include a mechanism for balancing students within their district by race or socioeconomic 
status in order to limit unintended consequences that may result from segregated schools. 
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Endnotes
 
1 In order to match comparison districts with the subject district, I used Census Data from 1990 and 2000 to 
calculate a propensity score.  The propensity score is the predictive probability (between 0 and 1) that a school 
district would participate in the controlled choice program.  The logit model used is Y=a+\x+r, where Y is a 
binary variable indicating whether the district used the controlled choice student assignment program and x is a 
vector of covariates including the 1990 population and the percent change between 1990 and 2000 in: children 
under 18; racial groups such as black, Hispanic, and white; and median income.  Given the predicted probability 
of participating in the program based on demographics from the model, I calculated the logit of the propensity 
score using the formula: logit=log[predicted value/(1-predicted value)].  After sorting on the logit, the “nearest 
neighbor” districts were designated part of the comparison group.  As there was only one subject district, it was 
not necessary to use additional caliper matching.  With few exceptions, the districts selected through the logit 
regression were the same as those used regularly as comparison districts by district officials.  The exceptions 
were districts with military bases, arguably subject to different demographic trends and changes than the district 
of interest.  
 
2 No strong indications of substantial departures from normality are indicated by plots of the random effects.  
Some nonnormal distributions indicate that there may be a slight violation of the normality assumption.  
However, the estimation of fixed effects will not be biased by a failure of the normality assumption at level 2 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 1998).  A formal test for normality of the random effects, based on the correlation 
between the ordered residuals and their expected values under normality (Shapiro-Wilk test) indicates that they 
are all over 0.94, over a general rule of thumb for normality at 0.90.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test resulted in 
measures under 0.10 for the random effects. 
 
3 However, as the level two residual slope variability and residual initial status/slope covariance are near zero, 
the composite residual variance will be homoscedastic, thereby satisfying the homogeneity assumption that the 
entire block diagonal error structure is repeated identically across schools (Singer and Willett 2003). 
 
4 District indicator variables were not included because of the correlation with the policy variable of interest. 
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Figure 1: Minority Dissimilarity Index
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Figure 2: Minority Exposure Index
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Figure 3: Poverty Dissimilarity Index
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Figure 4: Poverty Exposure Index
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Table 1: Demographic changes in North Carolina counties between 1990 and 2000 (U.S. Census Data) 
Population Percent Change between 1990 and 2000 
County 1990 2000 Pop. (%) 
Median 
HsHold 
Income 
(%) 
%
White 
%
Black 
%
Hisp. 
Children 
under 18 
(%) 
Increase 
in 
Number 
of 
Children 
under 18 
Forsy./WSF 265,878 306,067 15.12 38.25 6.29 18.73 903.93 19.09 12,338 
Cumber. 274,566 302,963 10.34 47.14 -2.25 20.90 66.40 20.02 14,811 
Durham 181,835 223,314 22.81 41.97 3.96 29.33 706.17 22.03 9,807 
Guilford 347,420 421,048 21.19 41.36 8.78 33.95 540.91 26.84 22,551 
Mecklen. 511,433 695,454 35.98 49.51 22.19 43.12 642.92 38.93 51,090 
Wake 423,380 627,846 48.29 51.81 39.87 40.08 597.49 59.86 62,011 
Table 2: Percentage of Minority and Poverty Students by District in Regular Elementary and 
Middle Schools 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Forsyth/WSF
Minority 39 40 41 42 44 45 46 47 48 50 51 
Poverty 28 28 29 32 39 40 38 39 37 36 41 
Cumber.            
Minority 48 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 
Poverty 36 37 37 43 39 41 41 42 42 41 37 
Durham            
Minority 55 57 59 62 63 66 67 69 71 72 71 
Poverty 33 35 34 40 40 38 45 44 41 41 0* 
Guilford            
Minority 40 41 42 44 45 47 49 51 53 54 53 
Poverty 28 29 30 31 33 34 35 35 37 36 37 
Mecklen.            
Minority 45 45 46 47 49 50 52 53 55 57 57 
Poverty 30 32 31 33 34 35 37 36 34 35 33 
Wake            
Minority 31 31 31 32 33 34 35 37 38 40 40 
Poverty 19 18 19 19 19 19 20 21 22 17 19 
*Durham County reported 0 students using free lunch for the 2002-2003 school year.  The outcome 
variable in 2002 for schools in Durham was coded as missing in the analysis. 
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 Table 3.  Coefficients from HLM Analyses of Difference Between the Percentage of Minority Students at 
Elementary/Middle Schools and the Percentage of Minority Students in the District, 1993 through 2002 
Single District Comparison 
(N=160 schools) 
Multiple District Comparison 
(N=560 schools) 
Model C 
(Eq. 3) 
Model D 
(Eq. 7) 
Model C 
(Eq. 3) 
Model D 
(Eq. 7) 
Fixed effects, initial 
status, '0i 
Intercept, 00 -2.766*** 
(0.141) 
-2.234*** 
(0.094) 
-2.787*** 
(0.148) 
-2.409*** 
(.052) 
Cumberland   0.474* 
(0.197) 
 
Durham   1.061*** 
(0.225) 
 
Guilford 0.875*** 
(0.180) 
 0.893*** 
(0.189) 
 
Mecklenburg   0.146 
(0.177) 
 
Wake   0.085 
(0.184) 
 
Rate of change, '1i Time, 01 0.134* 
(0.016) 
0.046** 
(0.010) 
0.137*** 
(0.017) 
0.040*** 
(0.006) 
Cumb.*Time   -0.102*** 
(0.022) 
 
Durham*Time   -0.176*** 
(0.026) 
 
Guil.*Time -0.113*** 
(0.021) 
 -0.115*** 
(0.021) 
 
Meck.*Time   -0.064** 
(0.020) 
 
Wake*Time   -0.102*** 
(0.021) 
 
Policy, '2i Policy, 02  0.407*** 
(0.112) 
 0.603*** 
(0.097) 
Variance and Covariance Components  
Level 1 Within school .199*** 
(.008) 
.165*** 
(.007) 
.315*** 
(.007) 
.307*** 
(.007) 
Level 2 Initial status .931*** 
(.127) 
1.071*** 
(.142) 
.985*** 
(.075) 
1.108*** 
(.082) 
Rate of 
change 
.011*** 
(.002) 
.012*** 
(.002) 
.011*** 
(.001) 
.012*** 
(.001) 
Policy 
variance 
 .929*** 
(.190) 
 .910*** 
(.205) 
Covariance 
intercept, time 
-.067*** 
(.012) 
-.071*** 
(.014) 
-.066*** 
(.007) 
-.072*** 
(.008) 
Cov: intercept, 
policy 
 -.250* 
(.126) 
 -.263** 
(.118) 
Cov: 
time, policy 
 -.043** 
(.014) 
 -.042*** 
(.014) 
Deviance 2447.1 2305.1 10132.8 10124.9 
*p<=.1  **p<=.01  ***p<=.001;  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 4.  HLM Predicted Values of the Difference Between the Percentage of Minority Students at 
Elementary/Middle Schools and the Percentage of Minority Students in the District 
(Fall 1992 through Fall 2002) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Forsyth/WSF 
(ref.) 0.062 0.071 0.081 0.093 0.107 0.122 0.140 0.161 0.184 0.211 0.242 
Cumberland 
(*/***) 0.099 0.102 0.106 0.110 0.114 0.118 0.122 0.126 0.131 0.136 0.140 
Durham 
(***/***) 0.178 0.171 0.165 0.158 0.152 0.146 0.141 0.135 0.130 0.125 0.121 
Guilford 
(***/***) 0.150 0.154 0.157 0.161 0.164 0.168 0.172 0.176 0.179 0.183 0.187 
Mecklen. 
(/**) 0.071 0.077 0.082 0.089 0.095 0.103 0.110 0.119 0.128 0.138 0.148 
Wake 
(/**) 0.067 0.069 0.072 0.074 0.077 0.080 0.083 0.086 0.089 0.092 0.095 
Significance compared to reference district for (intercept/slope); *p<=.1  **p<=.01  ***p<=.001. 
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Table 5.  Coefficients from HLM Analyses of Difference Between the Percentage of Students using Free 
Lunch at Individual Elementary/Middle Schools and in the District, 1992 through 2002 
Single District Comparison 
(N=160) 
Multiple District Comparison 
(N=560) 
Model C 
(Eq. 3) 
Model D 
(Eq. 7) 
Model C 
(Eq. 3) 
Model D 
(Eq. 7) 
Fixed effects, initial 
status, '0i 
Intercept, 00 -2.811*** 
(0.170) 
-2.501*** 
(0.106) 
-2.845*** 
(0.156) 
-2.576*** 
(.056) 
Cumberland   0.504* 
(0.207) 
 
Durham   1.332*** 
(0.236) 
 
Guilford 0.490* 
(0.216) 
 0.520** 
(0.198) 
 
Mecklenburg   0.245 
(0.187) 
 
Wake   -0.394* 
(0.194) 
 
Rate of change, '1i Time, 01 0.130*** 
(0.020) 
0.060*** 
(0.012) 
0.134*** 
(0.019) 
0.039*** 
(0.007) 
Cumb.*Time   -0.139*** 
(0.025) 
 
Durham*Time   -0.179*** 
(0.030) 
 
Guilford*Time -0.085*** 
(0.025) 
 -0.089*** 
(0.024) 
 
Meck.*Time   -0.070*** 
(0.023) 
 
Wake*Time   -0.080* 
(0.023) 
 
Policy, '2i Policy, 02  0.344** 
(0.109) 
 0.564*** 
(0.096) 
Variance and Covariance Components    
Level 1 Within schools .430*** 
(.018) 
.413*** 
(.018) 
.578*** 
(.013) 
.574*** 
(.013) 
Level 2 Initial status 1.261*** 
(.177) 
1.288*** 
(.179) 
.973*** 
(.081) 
1.176*** 
(.095) 
Rate of 
change 
.014*** 
(.002) 
.013*** 
(.002) 
.012*** 
(.001) 
.012*** 
(.001) 
Policy 
variance 
 .575** 
(.206) 
 .575** 
(.241) 
Covariance 
Intercept,time 
-.101*** 
(.018) 
-.090*** 
(.018) 
-.071*** 
(.009) 
-.079*** 
(.010) 
Cov: intercept, 
policy 
 -.358** 
(.136) 
 -.351** 
(.116) 
Cov: 
time, policy 
 .009 
(.016) 
 -.016 
(.017) 
Deviance 3348.4 3319.2 12304.4 12398.0 
*p<=.1  **p<=.01  ***p<=.001;  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table 6.  HLM Predicted Values of the Difference Between the Percentage of Students using Free Lunch 
at Elementary/Middle Schools and the Percentage of Students using Free Lunch in the District 
(Fall 1992 through Fall 2002) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Forsyth/WSF 
(ref.) 0.058 0.066 0.076 0.087 0.099 0.114 0.130 0.149 0.170 0.194 0.222 
Cumberland 
(*/***) 0.096 0.096 0.095 0.095 0.094 0.094 0.093 0.093 0.092 0.092 0.092 
Durham 
(***/***) 0.220 0.211 0.201 0.192 0.184 0.176 0.168 0.161 0.154 0.147 0.140 
Guilford 
(**/***) 0.098 0.102 0.107 0.112 0.117 0.122 0.128 0.134 0.140 0.147 0.153 
Mecklenburg 
(/***) 0.074 0.079 0.084 0.090 0.096 0.102 0.109 0.116 0.124 0.132 0.141 
Wake 
(*/*) 0.039 0.041 0.044 0.046 0.049 0.051 0.054 0.057 0.060 0.064 0.067 
Significance compared to reference district for (intercept/slope); *p<=.1  **p<=.01  ***p<=.001. 
Table 7: HLM Predicted Values of the Impact of Introducing Controlled Choice on the Distribution of 
Minority Students and Students in Poverty in the Average School within a District 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Minority  
Single 
County 
Non-
policy 0.107 0.112 0.117 0.123 0.129 0.135 0.141 0.148 0.155 0.162 0.170 
Policy    0.185 0.193 0.203 0.212 0.222 0.232 0.243 0.255 
All 
Counties 
Non-
policy 0.090 0.094 0.097 0.101 0.106 0.110 0.114 0.119 0.124 0.129 0.134 
Policy    0.185 0.193 0.201 0.209 0.217 0.226 0.236 0.245 
Poverty  
Single 
County 
Non-
policy 0.082 0.087 0.092 0.098 0.104 0.111 0.118 0.125 0.133 0.141 0.149 
Policy    0.138 0.147 0.156 0.166 0.176 0.187 0.198 0.211 
All 
Counties 
Non-
policy 0.076 0.079 0.082 0.086 0.089 0.092 0.096 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.112 
Policy    0.150 0.156 0.163 0.169 0.176 0.183 0.190 0.198 
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Appendix A: Timeline of Policy Changes in School Districts 
 
Cumberland Durham Guilford WSF Mecklenburg Wake 
1992 Neighbor/ 
busing 
Neighbor/ 
busing 
Neighbor/ 
busing 
Race 
busing 
Race busing Race 
busing 
1993   Merged 
city bus 
 
1994  Merged 
neighbor 
 
1995    Controlled 
choice 
 SES 
busing 
1996       
1997       
1998       
1999       
2000       
2001     Controlled 
choice 
 
School Choice, Racial Segregation, and Student Academic Outcomes 
 
Abstract 
One of the major questions in the school choice literature today is the impact of 
segregated schools on the academic achievement of students attending them.  This paper 
analyzes data for a sample of 3,819 students attending public, noncharter schools in a school 
district implementing a controlled choice student assignment plan between 1995 and 2003.  
During this time the schools in the district became more segregated—from +/- 10% to +/- 
45% of the district’s percentage of minority students.  The study uses North Carolina end-of 
grade test data to estimate multilevel models of achievement growth in Grades 3 through 8 in 
mathematics and reading, which are then used to test the hypothesis that the percentage of 
minority students at the school level impacts the academic test scores of students attending 
the school.  The findings confirm previous research regarding the racial achievement gap and 
indicate that the district is making some progress in closing that gap.  Findings also indicate 
that as the percentage of minority students in a school changes there is no discernable effect 
on student achievement growth over time that can be attributed to the racial makeup of the 
school.  This effect does not vary by race.   
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School Choice, Racial Segregation, and Student Academic Outcomes 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1966 the United States Department of Education (USDE) published the Coleman 
report reviewing the equality of education in the U.S. (Coleman, Campbell, Hobson, 
McPartland, Mood, Weinfeld, and York 1966).  The authors found that schools had little 
influence on academic achievement independent of a student’s background and general 
social context.  The report also confirmed the finding in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 
that widespread school segregation in the U.S. created inequality of educational opportunity.  
Since then, the methods and conclusions of the Coleman Report have been questioned and 
although researchers agree that there is a relationship between family background, peer 
effects, and student outcomes, they do not agree on the extent to which school policies could 
equalize opportunities between students of different socioeconomic and racial groups (Jencks 
and Mayer 1990).  Currently, integrated schools and equal opportunity seem to be less of a 
national priority than providing an adequate education for all students (National Research 
Council 1999).   
This study contributes to the desegregation debate by examining, in a rapidly 
resegregating district, whether attending segregated schools affects the annual growth in 
students’ academic performance.  Do minority students need to be exposed to a high 
proportion of white students in order to do well in school, or can schools with high 
percentages of minority students provide quality education?  The answer to this question has 
significant implications with respect to public school integration policies. 
This study uses a multi-level growth model to follow the trajectories of seven student 
cohorts from 3rd through 6th, 7th, or 8th grade to examine the impact of attending segregated 
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schools on changes in student test scores.  The district implemented a controlled choice 
student assignment plan in stages between 1995 and 2000.  District administrators split the 
district into eight zones, required parents to rank their preferred schools within their zone, 
and then assigned students to schools based on parental preference and school assignment 
policies.  A study examining segregation within the district between 1993 and 2003 found 
that the schools became resegregated during that period (Jones-Sanpei 2006b).   
Segregation Theory in Public Schools 
Over 50 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of Education 
(1954) that legally enforced separate schools deprived minority children of equal educational 
opportunities.  This decision was in part based on psychological and other social science 
research regarding intangible considerations—for example, separation denotes inferiority 
which then affects a student’s motivation to learn.  Since that time, social science research 
regarding segregation has progressed significantly.  Much of this research has been in the 
area of peer effects using test score outcomes. 
Research on peer effects–the impact of an individual’s social environment—shows 
that membership in a group influences individuals who belong to that group (Merton 1968). 
The peer culture, by providing a sense of community and belonging, influences its members’ 
responses to the social and academic learning environment (Knapp and Wooverton 1995).  
According to Blau (1964), peer interactions influence students as they adopt group 
definitions of costly behavior, or group norms.  Homans (1974) suggested that individual 
students may unconsciously create a personal cost-benefit matrix of social choices 
conforming to group expectations or norms (Homans 1974).  Conforming decisions then 
reinforce their self-identity as a member of a peer group (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).   
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Peer effects may operate in schools either directly through students or indirectly 
through resource allocation.  Peer effects operating directly through students may create a 
“culture of success” through high achievement and motivation (Jencks and Mayer 1990).  
This peer culture may be created through student learning interactions, motivational and 
aspirational influences, and the influence of peers on social behavior (Kahlenberg 2001).  
Peer effects may also be correlated with the available resources and organization of a school, 
thus indirectly influencing student academic outcomes.  Middle-class schools have better 
trained teachers, more challenging curriculum, and more involved parents, thus contributing 
to a potential decrease in the quality of low-income, minority schools (Cook and Evans 
2000). 
While peer effects operate at multiple levels and cannot be fully isolated, students’ 
peers have been shown to influence educational outcomes.  In general, researchers find some 
evidence of peer effects at the family and neighborhood level (Case and Katz 1991), high 
school level (Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992; Zimmer and Toma 2000),  and college level 
(Sacerdote 2000).   Furthermore, some studies show that a student may be more influenced 
by peers of the same race (Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2002; Hoxby 2000), while others 
found few or mixed effects from school segregation (Cook and Evans 2000; Schofield 1995).  
One recent study of school segregation estimated multilevel models for 14,217 students 
attending 913 high schools and found that socioeconomic segregation, not racial segregation, 
impacted the academic growth of all students, primarily through specific school practices and 
policies (Rumberger and Palardy 2005).  Other studies use OLS and econometric models to 
study racial and peer effects.  For example, Hanushek, Kain, Markman, and Rivkin (2000) 
removed student and school-by-grade fixed effects as well as observable family and school 
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characteristics in a matched panel dataset to find that peer achievement had a positive effect 
on student achievement growth.  A second study uses SAT scores and controls for family 
background and other factors to demonstrate that shifting from a fully segregated to a fully 
integrated city decreases the racial achievement gap by one-quarter (Card and Rothstein 
2006), although there was no significant school segregation effect.  The advantage of the 
current study over these investigations is that it uses a multilevel model which produces a 
more precise understanding of complex, hierarchical relationships (Heinrich and Lynn 2000) 
by partitioning the variance in the outcome measure between levels, avoiding aggregation or 
disaggregation bias, and providing separate errors.   
The primary difficulty with estimating peer effects in education is that the majority of 
variation in students’ peers is generated by selection.  Families select schools and other peer 
groups for a variety of reasons, including residential neighborhood (with socioeconomic 
implications), perceived quality, pedagogical, and possibly racial reasons (Hamilton and 
Guin 2005; Henig 1995; Saporito 2003), which creates an endogeneity problem in a study 
controlling for peer effects.  For at least some of the students and their families, the peer 
group is considered in the school choice decision.  In the present value-added study, these 
student characteristics, such as family and neighborhood effects, are assumed to be constant 
as school social compositions change.  As, the purpose of the study is to determine the effect 
on students’ academic achievement while attending schools with different racial 
compositions, the specific student characteristics are less important than holding those 
characteristics constant across all school settings. 
Over the past fifteen years a substantial literature on individual growth and school 
effect models in education has developed as multilevel models have been found to resolve 
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some of the problems with single-level models.1 Attempts to analyze multilevel data with 
single-level methods, such as OLS regression, results in aggregation bias and misestimated 
standard errors.   Multilevel models resolve these problems by analyzing data at different 
levels, not requiring an assumption of independence for individual cases, and allowing school 
effects, for example, to function at different levels (Lee 2000).  School effects tested in these 
models include school type (public, private) and size (Bryk and Driscoll 1988; Lee and 
Burkam 2003).  These studies have shown that school size and composition impact student 
academic outcomes and the learning environment. 
This study contributes to the literature on school effects of racial segregation by 
examining the educational trajectories of students as they attended increasingly segregated 
schools between 1995 and 2002.   The research is unique in that it examines time-varying 
school effects in a multilevel model.  The peer effects research discussed above suggests a 
potential negative impact on educational outcomes of attending segregated schools.  The 
hypothesis tested in this study is that students’ learning growth rates will vary as a function 
of the percentage of minority students in a school and that there will be an interaction effect 
between a student’s race and the percent of minority students in a school, in that the impact 
of attending segregated schools will vary by race.  A case study of a single county in North 
Carolina will be used to test this hypothesis over a period of time when the schools were 
becoming more segregated.  
Case Description 
The Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Public Schools district is the 107th largest school 
district in the United States, the 5th largest in North Carolina.  The student population was 
approximately 44,600—52% Caucasian and 48% minority students—during the 2000-2001 
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school year.  The 408 square-mile county is in the northern Piedmont area of North Carolina.  
The county population was 306,067 in 2000, the fourth most populous county in the state.  In 
2000, almost two-thirds of the population lived in Winston-Salem (185,776), while the 
remainder lived in outlying municipalities (69,882) or rural areas (50,409) (NC Center for 
Statistics, 24 April 2006).  Census data show that the increase in minority population 
between 1990 and 2000 was over 44%, with approximately 20,000 minority students in 2000.  
Much of this increase has been due to growth in Hispanic residents and students.  
Implemented between 1995 and 2000, the Choice Plan in the North Carolina 
Winston-Salem/Forsyth County School District (WS/FCS) divided the county-wide school 
district into eight zones and allowed families to choose between 4-5 elementary schools 
and/or 2-3 middle schools in each zone.  Between 1993 and 2002 the district schools became 
segregated.  In 1993, all of the regular elementary and middle schools, with the exception of 
three community-supported neighborhood schools, ranged between 22% to 56% minority 
students.  By 2002, the elementary and middle schools ranged between 13% and 99% 
minority students—eleven schools with more than 90% minority students (Jones-Sanpei 
2006b).  This created a unique situation to study the impact of attending segregated schools 
on student test scores as students moved in and out of increasingly segregated schools.   
The original Choice Plan contained a provision for maintaining a racial balance 
among the schools in the district.  However, two 1999 cases in the 4th Circuit restricted the 
ability of school boards to consider race in student assignments—Eisenburg v. Montgomery 
Public Schools (1999) and Tuttle v. Arlington (1999).  The U.S. Supreme Court will hear two 
cases in 2006 (McFarland v. Jefferson Co. Schools and Seattle School District No. 1) that 
may further impact the use of race in student assignment decisions. 
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During the first years of the Choice Plan, the district implemented the Equity Plus 
Program with the goal of reducing the achievement gap in test scores between white and 
minority students.  Approximately seventeen schools in the district (30%) were initially 
designated Equity Plus Schools based on the percentage of their students who receive free or 
reduced-price lunch (over 75% for elementary schools, over 50% for middle schools).  The 
number of Equity Plus Schools increased over time.  These schools offer smaller class sizes, 
with as few as 18 students in each kindergarten, first- and second-grade classroom.  The 
average class size for third through fifth grades was 20 students.  Teachers at Equity Plus 
schools also received a bonus of 20% of the local teacher pay supplement (2002).  
Unfortunately, because of the close correlation between the percentage of minority students 
and the percentage of students receiving free or reduced lunch, the effect of the Equity Plus 
program could not be included in the final model. 
Research Design 
Data 
The unit of analysis in this research is the student.  The identification strategy used is 
similar to one used by Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002) in a study of Texas schools, where 
the pattern of racial composition for successive cohorts is used to identify their fixed effects.  
The value-added growth model used in this study assumes that annual changes in test 
outcomes, measured at the end of the school year, are a function of student characteristics 
shown in the test scores from the previous year and the school peer environment, measured at 
the beginning of the school year, as influenced by the implementation of school choice in the 
district.  This is a significant assumption in that it assumes family, neighborhood, and school 
non-peer characteristics are constant.  Ideally, a complete vector of factors, including school 
resources, teacher effectiveness, organizational issues, community resources, racial and 
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socioeconomic student body composition, curriculum, family background, student 
demographics, student behaviors, aspirations, and any other variable that may affect 
educational outcomes, would be included in education program evaluations.  However, due 
to lack of data the complete vector is never available.  Studies of school effectiveness often 
include school-level variables such as school structure (public, private, charter), size, 
location, social composition, and academic organization (curriculum, tracking, graduation 
requirements) (Lee 2000).  The current study includes only public schools and their social 
composition.   
The data used for this analysis are from the North Carolina Education Research Data 
Center (NCERDC).  The NCERDC is a repository for all public education data in North 
Carolina.  The students were matched from year to year with a unique student identifier 
supplied by NCERDC for that purpose.  The data were then restricted to students attending 
public elementary and middle schools during grades 3 through 8, the years for which end-of-
year standardized exams were reported.  High school students were not included in the study 
because the end-of-year exam format changes after middle school and because high schools 
are less segregated than the smaller elementary and middle schools.  
Table 1 contains descriptive information at both the student and the school level for 
the matched population, the cohort population, and the cohort sample.  Students in all grades 
between 3rd and 8th are required to take end-of-grade tests in reading and math.  The eight-
year mean end-of-grade math score for the almost 26,000 students was 159.63 with a range 
between 100 and 208, and a standard deviation of 16.  The eight-year mean end-of-grade 
reading score was 154.51 with a range between 117 and 187, and a standard deviation of 11.  
Fifty-four percent of the students were white, 37% were black, and 5.65% were Hispanic.  
86 
The average number of observations per student was 4.82, with a total number of 117,407 
observations over a six-year period.  On average, each student attended 2.17 schools.  Over 
the eight-year study period, 46.27% of the total student population attending the 58 
elementary and middle schools included in the study were minority students and 36.44% 
were students using free or reduced lunch. 
The data were further restricted to include only those students with continuous 
exposure to the schools over the period of the study.  This includes approximately 60% of the 
students that sat for at least three 3rd through 8th grade end of year exams between 1995 and 
2002.  First, the data were restricted to students attending the target district public schools 
continuously from 3rd through 6th, 7th, or 8th grade in order to limit the influence of other 
school systems and unknown peer groups.  For example, some of the students left to attend 
charter schools and later returned to the traditional public schools.  Other students not 
included in the analysis were students retained after 3rd grade, students who moved into the 
area after 3rd grade, or students who left the public schools between 3rd and 6th grade.   These 
students were not included in the analysis in order to have consistent cohorts that progressed 
from 3rd to 8th grade and to minimize the effect of other school systems and unknown peer 
groups.  Thus, the students included in the analysis are those most likely to be impacted by 
the school choice implementation policy.  The cohort sample demonstrated some statistically 
significant differences from the total population (Table 1), although most of the differences 
appear minor.   The test scores were slightly higher, fewer minority and male students were 
included in the cohort population, and on average the cohort students attended 2.23 schools 
within the WS/FCS district compared to 2.17 for the total population.  This restriction will 
bias any findings of the study upward, providing an “upper limit” of the impact of racial 
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segregation.  For example, if the analysis shows negative impacts of attending segregated 
schools in this population with less geographic and school-type mobility, then the impact 
may be higher in a more transient population.     
The data were then randomly separated into 4 subsamples.  A descriptive analysis 
(Appendix A) revealed that the four subsamples were not significantly different in terms of 
minority status, gender, or usage of free and reduced lunch at the student level, although 
there were some differences at the observation level due to the large number of observations.  
The models below were created using one sample (Table 1), and then verified using the other 
three.   
It should be noted that this is a case study of one school district that imposed a 
rigorous strategy for controlled school choice.  Limitations of this study reduce its 
generalizability to elementary and middle school students who sustain their education within 
a particular school district.  The institutional environment and compensating programs are 
unique, limiting generalizability while providing a better understanding of the factors and 
programs that contribute to the findings.  Also, a complete vector of student, family, 
neighborhood, and school factors that may impact educational outcomes is unavailable; the 
unobserved heterogeneity will increase the potential for specification error.  However, 
despite these limitations, this study contributes significantly to the segregation literature by 
means of a unique opportunity to test a value-added academic outcome model in a rapidly 
resegregating school district. 
Methods 
Modeling student test score growth trajectories over time and within schools requires 
a multilevel model with random variation.  Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) have made major 
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contributions toward developing procedures to analyze nested data by using hierarchical 
linear modeling.  Multilevel approaches can produce a more precise understanding of the 
complex multi-level relationships (Heinrich and Lynn 2000) that exist in education policy 
situations—for example, improved estimation of individual effects, cross-level effects, and 
partitioning multi-level variance and covariance components (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).   
The two-level model used in this study includes individual growth trajectories at level-1 and 
the student characteristics at level-2.  The percentage of minority students in each school is 
included in level-1 as it changes each year.  This is different than the traditional school 
effects model, which for longitudinal studies is a three-level model (time, student 
characteristics, school characteristics) (Rumberger and Palardy 2005).  The parameters at 
each level-1 become the outcome variables in level-2.  In this way, the variation among 
student test scores over time becomes a dependent measure to be explained by individual 
student characteristics and  changes in school racial composition over time (Lee and Bryk 
1989).   
Equations 1 and 2 show the nested model with two levels of analysis—time (t) and 
student (i) (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  Because the school characteristics of race and 
Equity Plus designation were time-varying, they were included in level-1.   
At level-1, the test score mastery of student (i) at time (t) is represented as depending 
linearly on time, time-varying school (Sch) characteristics, an interaction effect, and a 
random error term.   
(1) Yti=e0i+e1itimeti+e2iSchti+e3iSchti*timeti+eti 
The time-varying school characteristics of interest include the percentage of minority 
students in the school that student (i) was attending at time (t) and Equity Plus status.  An 
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interaction effect between the percentage of minority students in a school and time was also 
included in the level-1 model to test the impact of school minority status on test scores as the 
students progressed from 3rd through 8th grade.  The error term, eti, is assumed independent 
and normally distributed with a mean of zero and a constant variance. 
At level-2, the intercept (baseline differences among all observations in the 
differential) and slopes of level-1 coefficients are represented as depending on student (i)’s 
characteristics and a random error term.2
(2) e0i=\00+\01Genderi+\02Grade3agei+\03Racei+r0i 
e1i=\10+\11Racei+r1i 
 e2i=\20+\21Racei+r2i 
 e3i=\30+\31Racei+r3i 
 
Student characteristics include gender, race, and the age of student (i) at time (0) when the 
student sat for the 3rd grade end-of-year exam.  The error terms are assumed normally 
distributed with a mean of zero and a constant variance.  The error term for each model 
captures the deviation of the level-1 coefficient (e) from the level-2 coefficient (\). 
 Results from hypothesis testing of fixed effects, random coefficients, and variance-
covariance components suggest that some covariates do not contribute significantly to the 
models.  For example, attending an Equity Plus school did not significantly impact either the 
reading or the math test scores of the students.  This finding could also be influenced by the 
high correlation between schools’ racial composition and free and reduced-lunch usage.  For 
these reasons, the Equity Plus covariate was not included in the final models.  Gender, 
however, did contribute to the reading model but not to the math model.  Neither gender nor 
age contributed to the slope, nor interacted significantly with the school racial composition.  
Therefore, they were only included in the intercept equation. 
Findings 
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To interpret the results, some information about the North Carolina standardized 
exam is necessary.  The North Carolina ABC’s accountability program measures growth in 
the aggregate as students progress from grade to grade.  Several other states and cities use 
growth models in their accountability systems as well, focusing on academic gains rather 
than raw achievement scores.  End of grade reading and mathematics tests are given for 
grades 3 through 8.  High school growth is based on end of course exams.  A school-level 
study of 37,000 fifth grade students by Ladd and Walsh (2002) found that schools serving 
low-income and minority students operate at a disadvantage under this system as basis for 
rewards and sanctions for school personnel.  A review of other accountability systems based 
on growth models indicates growing use of these models but significant measurement and 
implementation difficulties (Goldstein and Behuniak 2005).  However, this analysis uses just 
the raw scale scores to calculate an individual growth model for each student, not as a 
measure of school effectiveness. 
The mathematics and reading results are reported as scale scores, with the 2000 mean 
scores being 146 (math)/143 (reading) at grade 3 and 176 (math)/164 (reading) at grade 8.  
The raw scores are not designed to allow cross-grade comparisons as the test content, range 
of scores, and achievement level cutoffs differ for each grade.   However, the dependent 
variable (scale score) for this analysis was centered at the cutoff between achievement level 
II (inconsistent mastery, minimally prepared for the next grade) and achievement level III 
(consistent mastery and well prepared for the next grade).  In other words, a 0 indicates that 
the student was performing on the border of being minimally prepared for the next grade. 
 In addition to the dependent variable, two of the independent variables were centered.  
The percentage of minority students in each school was centered on 40%, a proposed tipping 
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point where the percentage of minority students in a school affects the future enrollment of 
non-minority students (Kahlenberg 2001).  The students’ ages were centered on the age of 
the average 3rd grade student—9.15 years old on the end of year exam day.  These 
modifications were made to aid in interpreting the data. 
Descriptive Results 
Figures 1 and 2 show the mean reading and math test scores, centered on the mastery 
cutoff, for seven cohorts of students in WS/FCS, as they progressed through 3 to 6 years of 
education.  The mean reading test scores (Figure 1) were relatively flat in 3rd and 4th grades, 
with a jump in 5th grade for all the students, a decrease in 6th grade back to the 4th grade level, 
and then a gradual increase through 7th and 8th grades.  The racial achievement gap remains 
consistent through the initial grades, but then appears to decrease somewhat during the 7th 
and 8th grades.  The mean math test scores (Figure 2) show an inconsistent nonlinear increase 
between 3rd and 6th grade and a decline between 6th and 8th grade for all race groups. 
The unconditional means models provide important information regarding the overall 
test score means and the variation over time, between students, and between schools.  The 
fully unconditional model, with no predictor variables specified at any level, permits the 
estimation of the proportion of variation that is across time (t) and within schools among 
students (i) (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  The models indicate that the overall mean reading 
score was 6.46 points above the mastery cutoff and the overall mean math score was 9.89 
points above the mastery cutoff.  The unconditional means model allows us to evaluate 
numerically the relative magnitude of the within-school and between-school variance 
components (Singer and Willett 2003).  The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) describes 
the proportion of the total outcome variation that lies between students.   The reading ICC 
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was 0.80 and the math ICC was 0.78, indicating that most of the total variation in test scores 
is attributable to differences between students rather than over time within the same students.  
The ICC and the results from the unconditional growth models, are not always reported in 
studies using individual growth models (e.g., Carbonaro and Gamoran 2002; Roderick and 
Nagaoka 2005); however, a frequently applied rule is that an ICC over 0.10 is nontrivial and 
indicates a need for multilevel analysis (Lee 2000).  School effect studies have reported ICCs 
from 0.09 (between school) to 0.23-0.40 (within-school) (Lee and Bryk 1989; Lee and Loeb 
2000).  
The unconditional growth models provide information regarding the initial status of 
students and their change over time, or slope.  The estimated initial status, or 3rd grade test 
score, was 5.66 points above mastery for the reading scores and 7.05 points for the math 
scores.  The average growth rate, or annual change, was 0.40 points in reading test scores and 
1.49 points in math test scores.  The level 1 residual variance was 14.32 for reading and 
18.52 for math, summarizing the scatter of each student’s data around her own linear change 
trajectory.  The residual variance for the unconditional growth model was less than that of the 
unconditional means model for both reading and math.  For reading, 12% of the within-
student variation in test scores was systematically associated with linear time.  For math, 
32% of the within-student variation in test scores was systematically associated with linear 
time.  Because the null hypotheses for the variance components can be rejected, we know 
that some important within-student variation still remains, suggesting that the model fit could 
be improved by introducing substantive predictors into the level-1 submodel.  These 
substantive predictors may include classroom and teacher effects that vary over time, such as 
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student-teacher relations as used in a study of school effects on drop-out behavior (Lee and 
Burkam 2003). 
The population covariance between true initial status and true change is quantified by, 
f01, -4.83 (reading) and -2.77 (math).  Reexpressing the reading test covariance as a 
correlation coefficient (-0.72) suggests that the relationship between a student’s true rate of 
change in reading test scores and her initial status was negative and large.  In other words, 
students that began with higher reading test scores in 3rd grade increased those test scores less 
rapidly over time than students who initially had lower test scores.  On the other hand, the 
correlation coefficient for the math test covariance was -0.24, suggesting that the relationship 
between a student’s true rate of change in math test scores and her initial math test score was 
negative and small.  In other words, students with higher initial math test scores in 3rd grade 
had slightly negative slopes compared to students with lower initial test scores.  Both of these 
findings indicate that greater gains over time are being made by students with initially lower 
test scores—more so in reading than in math—than students with initially higher test scores, 
suggesting a smaller variance in test scores during the later grades.    
Introducing time-varying predictors such as school racial composition in the level-1 
model, and student characteristics such as race and gender in the level-2 model explained 
some of the variation found in the unconditional models.  These results are explained 
separately below for the reading and the math models.   
Reading Model 
The findings for these models can be separated into three groups: general, student 
race, and school racial composition.  The general findings are consistent with previous 
research.  The intercept for the final reading model indicated that, on average, a white, male 
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student, attending a school with 40% minority students, who was the average age for his 
grade, scored 8.94 points above mastery on the end-of-grade reading exam (Table 2).  A 
female student, on average, scored slightly higher—9.82 points above mastery.  A male black 
student, on average, scored 0.25 points below mastery, and a male Hispanic student, on 
average, scored 0.04 points below mastery—almost a full standard deviation lower than the 
white students, on average.  A student who was a year older than the traditional age for his 
grade, on average, scored 2.09 points lower than his peers, or 6.85 points above mastery.   
The student race findings over time indicate that the racial achievement gap in 
reading is slowly decreasing in this district.  With each additional year of schooling, white 
students, on average, increased their reading scores by 0.18 additional points.  Black and 
Hispanic students, however, on average increased their reading scores each additional year 
by 0.53 and 0.98 respectively, significantly higher than the white students, demonstrating a 
decrease in the racial achievement gap over time.  There was no significant difference in the 
change over time between male and female students.  Figure 3 shows the predicted values of 
reading test scores centered on the mastery cutoff by student race during the six grades 
included in the study.  During this time, there was a noticeable decrease in the racial 
achievement gap. 
The findings regarding the effect of school racial composition do not support the 
hypothesis and suggest that a greater percentage of minority students in a school does not 
significantly affect student achievement growth over time.  The findings do confirm the 
existence of an initial school achievement gap.  The initial test scores of students attending 
schools with over 40% minority students were lower than their peers attending schools with 
fewer minority students.  For every additional 1% of minority students in a school, white 
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students’ initial average reading test scores decreased by 1.26 points—approximately a tenth 
of a standard deviation.  Black students, in contrast, had 3rd grade test scores 1.19 points 
higher than the white students for each additional 1% of minority students.  Hispanic students 
performed even better, with scores 1.57 points higher than the white students for each 
additional 1% of minority students in the school.  These racial differences, however, were not 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  The changes over time were very small and not 
significant, suggesting that attending a school with higher percentages of minority students 
did not adversely impact student test scores compared to attending a school with fewer 
minority students.  Similarly, there were no significant interactions between student race and 
the school racial composition over time. 
Estimates of the variance explained by the model indicate that 12% of the variance 
within students was explained by time.  The final model explained 29% of the variance in 
initial status and 17% of the variance in slope compared to the unconditional growth model.3
Math 
Again, the findings for the math model can be separated into three groups: general, 
student race, and school racial composition.  The intercept for the final math model indicated 
that, on average, a white, male student, attending a school with 40% minority students, who 
was the average age for his grade, scored 9.98 points above mastery on the end-of-grade 
math exam (Table 2).  There was no significant difference between male and female students 
with respect to math scores.  A black student, on average, scored 0.60 points below mastery 
(-10.58 below the average white student), and a Hispanic student, on average, scored 2.29 
points above mastery (-7.69 below the average white student).  A student who was a year 
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older than the traditional age for his grade, on average, scored 2.78 points lower than his 
peers, or 7.2 points above mastery.   
Again, the student race findings over time indicate that the racial achievement gap is 
decreasing in this district.  With each additional year of schooling, white students, on 
average, increased their reading scores by 4.18 additional points above mastery—38% of a 
standard deviation.  Black and Hispanic students, on average, increased their reading scores 
each additional year by 4.43 and 4.67 points respectively, significantly higher than the white 
students, indicating a very slight decrease in the racial achievement gap over time.  Figure 4 
shows the predicted values of math test scores centered on the mastery cutoff by student race 
over time, showing growth over time, a nonlinear trend, and a very slight decrease in the 
racial achievement gap. 
The findings regarding the effect of school racial composition on math test scores do 
not support the hypothesis and suggest that the percentage of minority students in a school 
does not impact student math test scores over time.  Unlike the reading test scores, the initial 
math test scores of students attending schools with over 40% minority students were not 
significantly different than their peers attending schools with fewer minority students. 
Furthermore, there were no significant racial differences in the intercept, or 3rd grade math 
test scores, nor were there significant differences by percentage of minority students in the 
school in slope, or changes in math test scores over time.   
Estimates of the variance explained by the model indicate that 32% of the variance 
within students was explained by time and 9% by the covariates added in the final model.  
The final model explained 34% of the variance in initial status and 48% of the variance in 
slope compared to the unconditional growth model.   
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Interpretation 
The results of this study, although limited to a single North Carolina county and 
school district, confirm previous research regarding the persistence of a racial achievement 
gap (Jencks and Phillips 1998).  Hispanic students consistently score 4-8 points lower on 
math and reading tests than white students, and black students consistently score 6-10 points 
lower, almost a full standard deviation.  The study also finds that in this district, significant 
but small reductions in the racial achievement gap are occurring during 3rd through 8th grade 
(Figures 3-4; Table 2).  These findings are consistent with a 2006 report on the racial 
achievement gap in North Carolina, which indicates that the racial achievement gap for 
grades 3-8 has been reduced from 30% in 2000-2001 to 21.6% in 2004-2005 (Reid 2006).   A 
study by Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2006) also found shrinking racial achievement gaps in 
North Carolina public schools, with Hispanic students gaining more than black students.  The 
results from this study indicate that Hispanic students’ test scores, on average, annually 
increased 0.50 points in math and 0.98 points in reading more than the average white 
student’s test score annual increase.  Similarly, black students’ test scores, on average, 
increased 0.25 points in math and 0.53 points in reading each year, also compared to the 
average white student.  However, despite the progress there is still a sizable racial gap in the 
8th grade test scores.  While a positive change over the course of 6 years is promising, the 
racial gap in initial status must change in order to have long-term societal results.  Even if 
school effects are completely eliminated through school reform, social policies that address 
the circumstances of student and family inequalities that affect learning will be necessary to 
reduce the gap in initial status.  
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These results also confirmed existing research on the gender achievement gap.  
Female students, on average, scored 0.88 points higher on the initial reading exam than male 
students.  However, there were no significant changes in these differences over time in the 
reading test scores.  Neither the initial mathematics test scores nor changes over time showed 
significant differences between males and females.  These findings are consistent with other 
research showing a gender difference in reading, but a much smaller gender difference in 
math (National Center for Education Statistics, Nation’s Report Card, 2005).  The finding 
that older students do worse on exams is supported by research on early grade retention, 
showing that the majority of students who have been retained (prior to third grade) do not do 
as well as their average peer in subsequent years (Randolph, Rose, Fraser, and Orthner 2004).   
Extending the study further to test the impact of attending a school with higher 
percentages of minority students during 3rd through 8th grade indicated that there was no 
significant impact on either math or reading test scores over time.  The hypothesis that 
students’ learning growth rates vary as a function of the percentage of minority students in a 
school is not supported by this analysis.  There was a slight positive effect in reading for 
white students, while there was a slight negative effect in math.  Interestingly, black and 
Hispanic students fared worse over time than white students in reading, but better in math.  
However, these findings were not significant.  These findings are surprising considering the 
number of studies finding a significant peer effect on achievement scores. 
These findings may be consistent with Rumberger’s and Palardy’s (2005) study that 
used multilevel modeling and NELS data to estimate the effect of attending segregated 
schools.  They found that socioeconomic segregation was more influential than racial 
segregation, and that in most subjects school process variables such as teachers’ expectations, 
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homework hours, advanced courses, and school safety explained all of the estimated effects 
of socioeconomic composition on achievement growth.  Not having access to these variables, 
one can surmise that the combination of using data from stable, student cohorts and the 
additional school and teacher resources provided by the district under the Equity Plus 
program may have reduced the expected effect of higher minority status in these schools on 
student achievement growth.  However, unlike the Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002) study 
that used panel data on Texas students to disentangle school racial composition effects and 
found a “higher percentage of Black schoolmates has a strong adverse effect on achievement 
of Blacks,” the current study found no interaction effect between the race of the student and 
the percentage of minority schoolmates. 
 One of the major limitations of this study is that in relating student trajectories to their 
school environments it is necessary to limit the analysis to students who remained within one 
district’s noncharter, public schools.  These are, by definition, less transient than students not 
included in the study.  Although the difference is small (see Table 1), the fact that fewer male 
and minority students were included in the cohort population is a limitation to the study.  
Another limitation is that the only available outcome measures are academic achievement 
test scores.  Other additional outcome measures that could be used if the students were 
followed through high school, are drop-out and graduation rates.  Futhermore, there are 
multiple purposes to education in addition to academic learning and test scores which should 
be reflected in multiple outcome measures (Jones-Sanpei 2006a).  It is possible that a 
longitudinal study following students into their post-high school careers would find long-
term impacts such as higher college graduation, occupational attainment, and integrated 
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workplaces from attending segregated schools that is not revealed in a cohort analysis of test 
score outcomes (Braddock, Dawkins, and Trent 1994; Trent 1997). 
Conclusions 
One of the major controversies in education policy today is over the educational 
impacts of school choice.  Proponents of school choice see it as a way to introduce market 
practices into public education, thereby encouraging schools to become more efficient and 
effective.  Opponents of school choice are concerned that it will result in further segregating 
public schools and increasing the gap in school performance between majority and minority 
students.  Understanding the impact of segregation on all students is essential to 
implementing successful education policies such as school choice that have the potential to 
impact the racial composition of public schools. 
When WSF first implemented the Choice Plan there was concern that it would 
resegregate the public schools to the detriment of minority students.  However, this study 
shows that at least for the majority of students in 3rd through 8th grades, any potentially 
negative consequences appear to be mitigated by the additional resources provided to low-
income schools.  The current study finds no significant impact on student test scores as the 
schools’ racial composition changed as a result of the implementation of school choice.  The 
implications of this finding for policies such as school choice that have the potential to 
segregate public schools are significant.  Other researchers, using different populations and 
methodologies, have found significant racial and interaction effects (Hanushek 2001; Hoxby 
2000).  Yet school choice implementation in this district, with its complementary teacher and 
classroom support strategies, demonstrates that at least in terms of academic test scores, 
minority students have not been negatively impacted academically—an “upper limit” for 
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stable students with additional resources in low-income schools.  Programs like the Equity 
Plus Program, while it did not appear to contribute to this model and was not included 
because of the correlation with schools’ racial composition, may be a factor in both reducing 
the racial achievement gap and in compensating for any negative impact on student test 
scores from attending schools with increasing numbers of minority students.   
 Overall, the results of this study suggest that at least for students who stay in the 
public schools, integration is not necessary for student achievement.  However, one of the 
policy questions that should be further reviewed is whether the additional cost of 
compensating schools with higher rates of low-income students rather than integrating those 
same schools outweighs the benefits of school choice programs.  Furthermore, limitations to 
this study suggest that there may be a significant impact on test scores for some students that 
is masked by the stable population included in this analysis.  Additional analysis of these 
students who move between school systems may reveal a “lower limit” or a negative impact 
from attending segregated schools.  Finally, the long-term benefits of integrated schools were 
not included in the analysis. 
 In conclusion, this study significantly contributes to our understanding of the factors 
associated with student academic achievement in an increasingly racially segregated school 
system.  The results indicate that students may not be as negatively impacted as some of 
suggested. Despite the results of this study, however, the goal of integration should not be 
summarily dismissed.  The effect of stable students attending segregated schools on 
academic test scores, while important, does not reveal the entire picture.  As this district 
demonstrates, compensating programs is essential and should be established and maintained 
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in districts with segregated schools.  The costs of these programs, compared to the costs of 
integration programs, should be weighed against the benefits of increasing school choice. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 For more information on multilevel growth models and multilevel modeling in general, see Raudenbush and 
Bryk (2002) and Singer and Willett (2003). 
 
2 Likelihood ratio tests indicated that the random effects contribute significantly to the model. 
 
3 These pseudo-R2 measures require caution as there is a potential for a negative pseudo-R2 when all, or most, of 
the outcome variation is exclusively either within-individuals or between-individuals (Singer and Willett 2003). 
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Table 1: Descriptive Information for Student and School Factors 
Total Cohorts Sample 
Student Factors  
Number of students 25,735 15,272 3,819 
Mean Mathscal 159.63 160.20 160.12 
Mean Readscal 154.51 155.09 155.06 
Asian 1% 0.88% 0.97% 
Black 37.37% 36.33% 36.48% 
Hispanic 5.65% 4.55% 4.77% 
White 54.12% 56.16% 55.62% 
Male 51.40% 49.93% 49.18% 
Total Observ. 117,407 75,520 18,794 
Mean Obs./Student 4.82 5.22 5.20 
Mean # Sch. Attended 2.17 2.23 2.24 
School Factors  
Number of schools 58 57 57 
Minority 46.27%* 45.29%* 45.30%* 
Poverty 36.44%* 35.47%* 35.38%* 
*annual mean averaged over study period 
109 
 
Table 2.  Fixed Effects from HLM Analyses of Student Test Scores in a 
Controlled Choice (Resegregating) School District, 1995 through 2002  
Reference Reading Math 
Intercept (white, male) 8.941*** 
(0.214) 
9.982*** 
(0.207) 
Fixed effects 
Time (white) 0.179*** 
(0.030) 
4.184*** 
(0.150) 
Time*Time   -0.842*** (0.073) 
Time*Time*Time   0.044*** (0.010) 
Female  
 
intercept 0.880*** 
(0.222)  
Black  
 
intercept -9.187*** 
(0.299) 
-10.583*** 
(0.327) 
Hispanic 
 
intercept -8.901*** 
(0.692) 
-7.688*** 
(0.761) 
Grade3age  -2.091*** 
(0.275) 
-2.777*** 
(0.343) 
Student Race * 
Time 
Time 
(black) 
0.529*** 
(0.053) 
0.252*** 
(0.065) 
Time 
(Hispanic) 
0.979*** 
(0.155) 
0.495** 
(0.186) 
School Minority % (white) -1.258* 
(0.573) 
-0.194 
(0.636) 
Student Race * 
School Minority % 
School Min. % 
(black) 
1.185 
(0.729) 
-1.033 
(0.811) 
School Min. % 
(Hispanic) 
1.569 
(1.710) 
-1.559 
(1.913) 
School Minority % * 
Time 
(white) 0.215 
(0.175) 
-0.096 
(0.215) 
SchoolMinority%* 
student race*time 
Sch Min.%*time 
(black) 
-0.324 
(0.231) 
0.392 
(0.284) 
Sch Min.%*time  
(Hispanic) 
0.002 
(0.582) 
0.890 
(0.708) 
Variance Components of Random Effects 
Intercept  58.017*** 69.195*** 
Time  0.451*** 0.667*** 
School Minority%  16.368** 15.845* 
School Minority% * 
time 
 0.736 2.484* 
-2 Res. Log. Likeli.  107,692.7 112,759.8 
AIC  107,726.7 112,793.8 
ICC (Unconditional model) 0.81 0.78 
R2 (Variance explained): 
Within person (time)  12% 32% 
Initial status (model)  29% 34% 
Slope (model)  17% 48% 
*p<=.10  **p<=.01  ***p<=.001;  Numbers in parentheses are standard 
errors. 
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Figure 1: Mean Reading Test Scores (Mastery=0) by Race
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Figure 2: Mean Math Test Scores (Mastery=0) by Race
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Figure 3: HLM Predicted Values of Initial Reading Test Scores and
Change over Time by Student Race (Mastery=0)
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Figure 4: HLM Predicted Values of Initial Math Test Scores and
Change over Time by Student Race (Mastery=0)
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Appendix A: Sample Variable Means and Statistical Differences
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
Student N 3,819 3,833 3,770 3,850 
gender 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.50 
race 4.88 4.89 4.94 4.91 
Pov1 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Pov2 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.38 
Pov3 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.37 
Pov4 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.34 
Pov5 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.30 
Pov6 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.28 
Observations N 18,794 18,984 18,658 19,084 
Gender* 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 
Race* 4.90 4.89 4.96 4.93 
Poverty* .35 0.36 0.34 0.34 
policy .79 0.78 0.78 0.79 
zone 7.43 7.46 7.51 7.48 
spermin .45 0.46 0.45 0.45 
sperpov* .35 0.36 0.35 0.35 
mathscal 160.12 160.21 160.40 160.07
readscal 155.06 155.06 155.24 155.01
numobs 5.20 5.23 5.23 5.23 
*Statistical difference between groups at p<0.05. 
Appendix B. Parameter Estimates for Unconditional Models 
Unconditional Means Model Unconditional Growth Model 
Math Reading Math Reading 
Mean     
Initial achievement 9.89*** 
(0.166) 
6.46*** 
(0.133) 
7.05*** 
(0.176) 
5.66*** 
(0.155) 
Achievement growth   1.49*** 
(0.030) 
0.40*** 
(0.023) 
Parameter variance     
Within students (level 1) 27.25*** 
(0.321) 
16.28*** 
(0.193) 
18.52*** 
(0.252) 
14.32*** 
(0.191) 
Between students (level 2)     
Initial achievement 97.36*** 
(2.395) 
63.41*** 
(1.558) 
104.90*** 
(2.703) 
81.62*** 
(2.113) 
Achievement growth   1.27*** 
(0.080) 
0.54*** 
(0.045) 
Correlation—Initial intercept/growth   -2.77*** 
(0.344) 
-4.83*** 
(0.254) 
Intraclass correlation coefficient 0.78 0.80   
*p<=.10  **p<=.01  ***p<=.001;  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
